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Introduction
1
This document demonstrates how municipal 
governments can, and often do, serve as the 
cornerstone for building peace and managing 
conflict. It uses four case studies to illustrate 
the various ways municipal governments may 
contribute to peacebuilding and conflict manage-
ment in the course of their conventional work,
from the provision of basic health and social 
services to public safety, transportation, and 
local economic development (see Annex A). 
It includes a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
table (Annex B), to assist those seeking to enhance
the potential peacebuilding impact of the work 
of municipal governments. This requires the sys-
tematic inclusion of Peace and Conflict Impact 
Assessment (PCIA) into the design, implementa-
tion and evaluation of all municipal activities in
conflict-prone areas. PCIA is a useful means of
understanding and measuring peace and conflict
impacts in a comprehensive or systematic way.
While PCIA is relatively new, it is an extremely
important process that helps ensure that initiatives
do not aggravate violent conflict and, as far as
possible, contribute to building peace within and
between communities.
This document seeks to remind local and inter-
national actors of the important role played by
municipal governments in facilitating and promoting
peacebuilding through their work in local level
governance and service provision.
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Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding 1
2
Municipal government plays a dual role: promoting
the democratic process at the local level, and
delivering basic local services. The scope of
municipal government responsibilities in any given
location varies a great deal and depends on the
extent of decentralization of central government
services, municipal population and revenue. The
table in Annex A illustrates the range of responsi-
bilities based on the example of municipal govern-
ment in Canada. 
Characteristics of Effective 
Local Government
Strong and effective municipal government is
defined by five distinct characteristics that reflect
its unique roles in democratic governance and
service delivery. Each of these characteristics has
significant implications for the role of local gov-
ernment in peacebuilding and conflict resolution:
Legitimate leadership. The legitimacy and 
credibility of a municipal government is intimately
tied to a transparent and representative process
of policy making by a council of democratically
elected community leaders that enjoys legal
3
1 This section was written by Michel Fromojvic, with input by Kenneth Bush and Myn Garcia
recognition as an established corporate entity. 
In many cases, the tradition of strong local 
government pre-dates current forms of national
government. As a result, mayors and senior elected
officials are often respected, and trusted community
leaders who are able to bridge divergent interests
and ideas. In cases where national governments
lack the capacity to reach local communities – or
in cases of devolved or decentralized government,
such as in the Philippines – municipal government
is often the only functioning state presence at the
local level. In the context of decentralization,
municipal governments are mandated to perform
certain devolved functions and/or deliver services. 
Ability to touch the daily lives of citizens
through improved delivery of services.
An important characteristic of effective local 
government is its proximity to the recipients of the
basic services it provides. Municipal government
is well-recognized for its role in providing basic
infrastructure such as drinking water, waste 
management, construction of latrines and public
convenience facilities, recreational facilities and
parks, and local roads. Decentralization of national
government responsibilities has meant that local
authorities have an increasingly important role 
to play in the delivery of basic social services,
including primary and secondary schooling, early
childhood education, public health care and 
social assistance.
Close working relationship with communities
and community organizations. Their involvement
in the delivery of basic services has provided
municipal governments with a greater sensitivity
to the unique needs of the individuals, families and
communities within its jurisdiction. The focus on
local-level service delivery has also strengthened
working relations between municipal governments
and community-based organizations and NGOs
active at the local level. As a result, municipal
governments are better able to respond to the
basic needs of well-established, privileged com-
munities and marginalized groups. This includes
an increased capacity to develop constructive
approaches to work with and develop an under-
standing of the informal sector. Partnerships
between municipal government and community
organizations have led to increased capacity 
and leadership within civil society, as well as
opportunities for identifying new solutions to 
local challenges.
Participatory, transparent governance.
Participatory governance provides the opportunity
for all citizens, including marginalized groups, 
to become partners in government. It enables a 
decision-making framework for establishing policy
priorities by fostering an environment of mutual
learning and collaboration between government
and civil society, which enhances government’s
capacity for openly engaging civil society in the
decision-making process. It also promotes the
inclusion of social issues into the decision making
process. Community empowerment reinforces civil
society confidence in municipal government and
creates a stronger sense of stakeholder responsi-
bility for policy and development outcomes. 
Opening up local government to popular participa-
tion and improving partnerships with civil society
and the private sector fosters greater transparency
and accountability in local government priority
setting, budgeting and service delivery. This may
be achieved, for example, through the preparation
of participatory local development strategies and
action plans.
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Strengthening public participation for 
peacebuilding. Municipal governments play a
crucial role in encouraging/harnessing/facilitating
participation of various stakeholders in promoting
peace including supporting local level, community-
based peace initiatives involving peace advocates
from the ground. Public participation and community-
based mechanisms such as dialogues, consultations
and public information campaign may be effectively
undertaken by the municipal governments in part-
nerships with peace advocates and peace bodies
in the community, possibly even at
the national and interna-
tional spheres. 
By working within such strategic partnerships
(local, national and international), municipal 
governments may optimize their positive 
peacebuilding impacts.
Focal point for facilitation and coordination 
of service delivery and decision-making.
The management and delivery of services at the
local level often crosses jurisdictional boundaries
and cuts through lines of governmental responsi-
bility. Solutions are being found through increased
cooperation among neighboring governments and
across levels of government. This can include
alliance building for planning and programming,
resource sharing and networking. 
Strong local government is not only a means of
delivering municipal services, but also a highly
effective mechanism for ensuring that national
policies and programs are appropriately tailored 
to local realities. Drawing on the capacities of
municipal governments is an important way
for national governments to touch local
issues, be more aware of local needs
and therefore be able to respond to
local needs. 
Municipalities are increasingly communicating
with each other in order to better coordinate services
and advocate for change at the national level.
Associations of municipal governments serve to
articulate locally defined concerns and provide 
an essential forum to disseminate good practices.
These same Associations are also beginning to
develop their own programs that are delivered
with and for the benefit of their members.
Coordination within municipal governments is 
also improving. Rather than relying on individual
departments, municipal governments are beginning
to tackle complex issues using integrated and
holistic approaches. Inter-departmental coopera-
tion and multi-sectoral responses have led to 
more coordinated development and more efficient
and effective use of local resources. As a result,
municipalities traditionally involved in basic service
delivery, are better able to address complex social
issues such as crime, drug addiction, homeless-
ness, HIV/AIDS, and child prostitution. These new
approaches have succeeded in defining and reach-
ing specific target groups and designing services
to meet the specific needs of these groups.
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These unique characteristics are important factors
in understanding the role of municipal government
in peacebuilding, and the scope of work that exists
in strengthening their role and effectiveness. 
Relevant Canadian Experience
Although Canada is not characterized by open
intra-state violent conflict, the Canadian municipal
government context exemplifies many effective
practices and mechanisms relevant to peacebuilding.
While Canadian municipalities are still learning
and experimenting with many of these practices,
they provide a foundation for contributing to peace
and avoiding conflict.
Municipal government in Canada has two primary
dimensions: democratic governance and service
delivery. Local government in Canada reflects a
basic democratic structure: the primary governing
body is the municipal council whose members are
elected by citizens to exercise the powers of the
corporation on their behalf. Municipal staff is
appointed and ensure the delivery of services.
Political parties are generally not major players in
local politics. Specific local interests are usually
advanced by various citizens groups and business
groups. 
Canadian municipal governments have established
credible, trusted, accountable and responsive 
systems of administration, budgeting, hiring, and
procurement at the local level. Citizen participation
has become an established feature of the local
political landscape. Canadian municipalities in 
the process of preparing long range development
plans now regularly put in place effective mecha-
nisms that include citizens from diverse ethnic and
socio-economic backgrounds. Similarly, citizens
are able to acquire information concerning decisions
affecting their immediate lives such as changes 
in land use and proposed construction projects. 
In many cases, citizens and community organiza-
tions are able to influence these decisions.
In the area of service delivery, residents of
Canadian municipalities have come to rely and
trust municipal systems that manage the delivery
of basic services such as drinking water and
garbage collection. Municipalities contribute to
the physical fabric of civil society by providing
roads, sidewalks, streetlights and bridges. They
provide and regulate transportation systems,
including urban transit, airports, harbors, taxi
industries, and generally the movement of traffic
as well as parking. Urban planning and the regu-
lation of land use, industrial areas and economic
development also fall within the municipal mandate.
Similarly, locally-controlled public schooling systems
deliver quality education accessible to all residents.
Within this context, such municipal government
activities might be seen as being relatively uncon-
tentious, if not technical. However, in cases of violent
inter-group conflict, the politicization and misman-
agement of these basic services (the privileging,
favoring or exclusion of one group over another)
can push tensions and non-violent conflict over
the edge into a spiral of escalating violence.
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Municipalities do much to ensure public safety
and have a wide range of regulatory powers.
Protective services include emergency services
such as police, fire, and ambulance. Health services
are geared to the prevention and control of com-
municable diseases, the availability of potable
water and the maintenance of sanitary standards
in the handling of food and the management of
waste. In some parts of Canada, the provision 
of social services, such as the administration 
of social assistance, homes for the elderly, emer-
gency shelters and public housing, is assigned 
or contracted to local governments by provincial
governments. The principles of efficiency and
accessibility that underpin Canadian municipal
government delivery of such services are not,
however, universal. Only when we turn out atten-
tion to other cases – especially those in violence-
prone settings – can we begin to appreciate how
the operationalization of these principles might 
in fact have a profound peacebuilding impact 
(as illustrated in the Bosnia & Herzegovina 
case study).
In Canada, the provision of child care and public
transit by municipal governments may be seen to
provide access to employment opportunities to
individuals and groups who might otherwise be
excluded. However, in violence-prone settings, 
the same services may create peacebuilding
opportunities and incentives for groups in conflict
to cooperate and share their benefits. Alternatively,
they may increase competition and friction between
groups over the distribution of their benefits. In
Canada, municipalities strengthen new immigrant
and refugee communities by increasing their
access to employment and municipal services
through language training, subsidized day care
and public transit. Support to local economic
development, community development initiatives
and the development and management of subsi-
dized housing cut across racial, ethnic, religious
and socio-economic boundaries. The peacebuilding
potential of similar programmes outside of Canada
is considerable.
Not all these examples can be found in all Canadian
municipalities. However, these and other initiatives
suggest the importance of learning from, sharing,
and adapting Canadian practices in local gover-
nance beyond the boundaries of Canada with a
self-conscious awareness of their peacebuilding
potential.
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Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 2
3
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is a
means of anticipating, monitoring, and evaluating
the ways in which an intervention may affect or
has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict in 
a conflict-prone region. 
PCIA is a multi-faceted process, similar to Gender
Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment,
which helps identify and understand the impact 
of an initiative on peace or conflict. PCIA can be
used in a broad range of conflict-prone settings,
i.e. places where there is a risk that non-violent
conflict may turn or return violent. PCIA must be
integrated into each stage of the project cycle –
design, implementation and evaluation – if it is to
produce a comprehensive and accurate assessment
of the peace and conflict impact.
PCIA is an extremely important and useful process
that will help you ensure that initiatives you are
working on do not aggravate violent conflict and,
as far as possible, contribute to building peace
within and between communities. From the per-
spective of peace and conflict impact, the way 
we do our work, is as important (sometimes more
important) as the type of work we do. 
2 This section was written by Kenneth Bush and Michel Fromojvic.
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The following principles are intended to serve as a
guide to Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments:
PCIA is a process, not a tool. While some people
would like a ‘PCIA Tool Kit’ that can be applied
anywhere, doing a PCIA will not make a difference
unless it challenges and changes the way work 
is done in conflict zones. We may not have to do
different work, but we will have to do our work 
differently. PCIA challenges us to fundamentally
rethink our work.
PCIA is not static. PCIA is an on-going and
dynamic approach taken before, during and after
an intervention or project.
PCIA must be transparent, shared and people
focused. The real experts of PCIA are the women,
men, girls and boys living in conflict zones. If they
are not centrally involved in peace and conflict
analysis and interpretation, then PCIA will fail. If 
a community does not believe a PCIA is genuine 
or legitimate, if they believe that it is not in their
interests or if they believe that it will be used to
force unwanted decisions on them, they will most
often reject the process and its outcomes. 
Building peace involves un-building the
structures of violence. Just as the removal of
the structures of violence does not automatically
bring peace, adding/ strengthening peace capacities
does not automatically stop violence. Peacebuilders
must strategically consider how to unbuild the
structures of violence and build capacities for
peace.
PCIA helps understand the specific rather
than the general. PCIA helps us see and under-
stand when, why and how a specific factor in a
particular situation is likely to contribute to peace
or violent conflict. For example, many believe that
poverty leads to violent conflict. However, when
we look closely at different cases we see that
sometimes they appear related and sometimes
they do not. PCIA helps to identify and understand
the when, why and how poverty may be related 
to violent conflict.
Look for both the peacebuilding impacts and
the conflict-creating impact. When using PCIA,
it is often easier to identify the conflict-creating
impacts of development projects (e.g. health, edu-
cation, water and sanitation, provision of public
services projects). Violence, especially militarized
violence3, always gets more attention than peace.
For this reason, we need to improve our ability to 
3 Militarized violence conveys a more accurate sense of the nature of contemporary violent conflict than the word war. It includes: conventional military 
engagements between organized forces; abuses defined as dirty wars; control through terror and the manipulation of fear; systematic abuse of human rights; 
and a totalizing process by which all social, political, and economic problems come to be defined as military problems—and, as military problems, the most 
suitable response is deemed automatically to be the application of the weapons of war.
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identify and strengthen the peacebuilding impacts
of projects or initiatives. Simply labeling an initia-
tive a peacebuilding project does not make it so. 
Neither development nor peacebuilding will
create peace on its own. Development and
peace-building initiatives can make important 
contributions to peace and unity. However, on
their own they will not create peace. Full, genuine
and lasting peace requires substantive and 
on-going efforts by a wide range of actors (local,
national, regional, international) in a broad range
of activities (military, trade, development and
humanitarian assistance, etc.).
PCIA takes time. Despite the time pressures that
always affect the planning and implementation of
a project or initiative, there needs to be time for
genuine dialogue, learning and capacity-building.
A rushed PCIA is most likely an ineffective PCIA.
Key Areas of Peace or Conflict Impact 
The key to a successful PCIA is asking the right
questions, in the right context, at each stage in the
project cycle. The framework provided in Annex B
highlights five areas in which municipal government
activities may have a peace (or conflict) impact:
• Conflict management capacities;
• Militarized violence and human security;
• Political structures and processes;
• Economic structures and processes; and
• Social empowerment.
Effective governance at the local level is a crucial
component within each of these five key areas.
These impact areas provide a framework for
strengthening local governance capacity to build
peace and dismantle the structures of violent 
conflict. The case studies in Section IV illustrate
how this framework may be used to scan and 
analyze the peace and conflict impact of selected
examples of municipal government projects in
conflict-prone settings. 
Area 1 
Conflict Management Capacities 
Conflict management capacities of local 
government might include their abilities to:
1) think about and identify peacebuilding 
challenges and opportunities; 
2) restructure themselves to respond to peace-
building challenges and opportunities; and 
3) change how they work, to ensure that they 
are able to respond effectively and efficiently,
in ways that have a concrete, positive peace-
building impact, e.g. by improving fairness,
equity, “even-handedness,” accountability 
and transparency.
Weak and inappropriate management practices
have the potential to worsen or create conflict
leading to the use of violence. Thus, one area
addressed by PCIA is the capacity of local govern-
ment to avoid or resolve violent conflict at the
local level and to promote genuine, sustainable
peace through formal and informal mechanisms
and standard operating procedures used in the
course of its day-to-day work. 
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An example of a hands-on role in peacebuilding 
is provided in the Philippines case study. Among
other things, Local Government Units (LGUs) are
being trained in peace negotiation, facilitation 
and dialogue skills. These skills are not intended 
to enable LGUs to negotiate peace agreements for
the multiple violent conflicts afflicting the Philippines,
but rather are meant to be used during the normal
work of municipal governments. In conflict-prone
settings, the work of municipal governments
inevitably affects the dynamics of peace or conflict
through the services they provide. For example,
local authorities influence access to scarce land
through land allocation, land use planning and land
management. A transparent system of land use
planning serves as a mechanism for preventing
conflict. In the area of the provision of basic services,
local governments incapable of expanding the
delivery of basic infrastructure and services into
traditionally marginalized and neglected areas may
contribute to conflict created by socio-economic
inequalities. 
Local authorities are also in a good position to
maintain ongoing communication with a network
of community leaders and grassroots organiza-
tions. This can contribute to the timely mobilization
of the resources needed to address potential vio-
lence at its earliest stage, such as opening lines 
of communication between and within groups that
local government is mandated to represent. 
For a municipal government to effectively manage
conflict through the delivery of public goods and
services, it must be trusted and legitimized by rep-
resentative groups within a conflict-prone area.
Thus, for example, legitimacy may be reflected in
the ability of senior local elected officials – such
as the mayor – to serve as a trusted third party
who is able to create the neutral space for groups
to identify, address and, possibly, resolve their
immediate conflict. 
Local-level law enforcement is a particularly
important municipal governance issue in conflict-
prone areas. A law enforcement agency, which is
trusted and legitimized by the public may become
the foundation for the transition from the conflict
ridden post-conflict period to genuinely peaceful
coexistence. A municipal government seen as
unfair in its decision making and corrupt in its
delivery of services will not only fail to resolve
local conflicts, it is likely to aggravate tensions
leading to violent conflict. 
Area 2 
Militarized Violence and Human Security
This is defined by patterns and levels of conflict
occurring within a municipality, directly and 
indirectly related to militarized violence, crime,
rights abuses and corruption. It is reflected in 
the corresponding degree of fear and insecurity
experienced by residents of a municipality, 
including physical and mental well-being and
sense of individual and group identity. 
Here, we need to remember that, because 
different groups in society experience different
levels and types of violence, they may have 
different levels of insecurity and vulnerability, 
e.g., women, children, minority groups, returnees
and other marginalized groups. The sources of
threat and insecurity are militarised forces –
which may include national armed forces, 
rebels, paramilitaries, war lords, militias, bandits,
organized crime rings, vigilante groups and 
police – that use military weapons, structures, 
and tactics.
Municipal government has direct and indirect
influence on the impacts of, and responses to 
violence and insecurity within its jurisdiction. For
example, municipal governments are in a position
to ensure that law enforcement strategies are fair
as well as effective. This includes ensuring equal
and fair access to justice through local police
services and courts systems, in addition to the 
fair treatment of individuals who have been detained,
arrested, or imprisoned. Municipal governments
often provide emergency shelters and support
services for abused women and their children 
on an on-going basis. Under crisis and war-like
conditions, similar services may be offered to 
displaced persons. At the level of long range 
planning, municipalities can implement policies
that ensure the integration of principles of safety,
justice and equity into urban design and service
delivery.
Area 3 
Political Structures and Processes
Political structures and processes refer to the
governance capacities of different levels of 
government as reflected in local decision making,
and the extent to which local elected officials and
municipal government services are responsive 
to the needs of civil society, and the ability of 
civil society actors to participate in the political
processes actively and constructively. This might
be seen in: increased or decreased transparency,
accountability, and participation in decisions affect-
ing the public; the strengthening or weakening of
the rule of law and representative government;
increased/decreased and more/less inclusive 
levels of participation in terms of geographic 
and sectoral group representation, especially the
participation of women and other marginalized
groups; the strengthening or weakening of the
capacities of legitimate leaders; and the strength-
ening or weakening of anti-democratic forces.
In general, this will reflect a system of local gover-
nance that is built on the active and constructive
participation of civil society in agenda setting and
decision-making. At the simplest level, the legiti-
macy of political structures and processes can 
be measured in terms of the level of participation
in local government elections. In the absence 
of meaningful civil society participation, local 
government loses its claim to legitimacy and 
corresponding responsibility to manage public
resources and represent the interests of society
as a whole. The effectiveness of political struc-
tures is determined by the degree to which poli-
cies are formulated and implemented justly and
efficiently, including those concerning fair employ-
ment, provision of subsidies, procurement policies,
corruption by elected officials and municipal staff. 
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If civil society is to grant legitimacy to municipal
government, then the latter must play an active
role in engaging civil society in local decision
making. Municipal governments that have suc-
ceeded in engaging the public have done so by
demonstrating their commitment to genuine public
participation in ways which are reflected in their
budgets, the openness of their meetings and the
effectiveness of mechanisms to integrate the 
public into agenda-setting and decision-making.
Citizen engagement can also extend to opportuni-
ties for residents and community organizations to
work with municipal government in the delivery 
of services.
Peacebuilding and conflict management is founded
on the ability of a municipal government to suc-
cessfully build an open and trusting relationship
with its residents and the organizations and com-
munity leaders that represent different groups
within the municipality. 
Area 4 
Economic Structures and Processes 
This area of peace or conflict impact refers to the
strengthening or weakening of the socio-economic
structures and process in the municipality and the
ability of municipality government to catalyze 
economic development at the local level. Equally
important is the ability of government to ensure
that the resulting benefits are shared amongst 
all citizens. Perceptions of how economic devel-
opment is benefiting or disadvantaging different
groups within society can serve as a catalyst for
peace, or for conflict. 
Most municipalities are typically responsible for
delivering an extensive range of services related
to stimulating local economic development. Most
notable is the ability of municipalities to access
financing or enter into partnerships with private
sector organizations in order to invest in basic
infrastructure and deliver associated services.
Strategic investments in physical and social
infrastructure may have a multiplier effect, which
attracts further economic investment and expands
community access to infrastructure and services.
Municipalities also play a role in promoting local
economic development by engaging the local
business community as a partner, and lobbying 
the other levels of government for programs and
resources. The capacity of municipal government
to influence local economic development is 
relevant in: (1) a violence-prone setting, as a
means of preventing conflict; (2) in-conflict 
settings as a way of defusing violent flare-ups; 
and (3) post-conflict settings as a contribution to
peacebuilding and the dismantling of some of the
economic causes or irritants of violent conflict.
Area 5 
Social Empowerment
This fifth area of peace or conflict impact encom-
passes the ability of local government to build a
culture of peace, strengthen civil society and 
contribute to an environment characterized by
empowerment, constructive social communication,
tolerance, inclusiveness, justice, participation and
respect. This includes nurturing the confidence and
capacities of citizens, community organizations and
local businesses to deal effectively and non-violently
with the normal tensions generated by competition
within civic and economic life. Other measures of
social empowerment include the degree of local
ownership over peace processes; the
level of participation by “marginal-
ized” or “dis-empowered” groups in
the process of peacebuilding, and the
level and type of social interactions
between groups within civil society.
Municipal government may con-
tribute to social empowerment 
in a number of ways. When it is 
a legitimate and trusted institution,
local elected officials are in a posi-
tion to play an important leadership
role in facilitating and coordinating
the efforts of local actors to build
civil society institutions. Social
empowerment may be nurtured
through the actions of municipal 
governments to address poverty,
including the delivery of basic 
health and social services, and
removing income-related barriers 
to employment such as public 
transit and daycare.
14
15
Case Studies in Local Governance and Peacebuilding
4
The four following case studies highlight the contri-
butions of municipal government to peacebuilding
at the local level in three countries at different
stages of violent conflict: the Philippines, the
Palestinian Territories and Bosnia & Herzegovina.
Each case study illustrates how the impact of
every violent conflict is ultimately experienced
locally, regardless of the factors that may have
caused or sustained it. For this reason, the peace-
building dimension of municipal government is as
important as it is unavoidable.
In each of the four cases, municipal governments
are legitimate authorities functioning at the local
level with day-to-day responsibilities for local 
governance and service provision. What becomes
clear is that effective and legitimate structures of
governance are key factors in transforming and
defusing violent conflict – just as ineffective and
illegitimate structures of governance are key 
factors in pushing non-violent conflict into the
realm of violence.
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Canada-Bosnia & Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government
Cooperation Programme (CBiHCP) 4
Case Study 1
1. Peacebuilding & Unity Context
Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) is a complex ethnic
mosaic. In 1991, 44 percent of the population
described themselves as Muslims, 31.5 percent 
as Serbs (Orthodox Christians) and just over 
17 percent described themselves as Croats
(Roman Catholics). The rest belonged to other
identity groups, including 5.5 percent who
declared themselves Yugoslavs. These descrip-
tions hide the fact that before the conflict, one 
in every three marriages in BiH was a mixed 
marriage that crossed ethnic lines.
Prior to 1992, the majority of Muslims, also called
Bosniaks, lived in cities and towns along side
Serbs and Croats. The Serbian minority generally
lived in rural areas and formed majorities in large
areas of Bosnia. The Croat minority tended to live
in areas closer to the Croatian border, although
there were substantial Croatian communities in
ABSTRACT
The militarized conflict that took place in Bosnia &
Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995 crippled political and
economic systems, destroyed infrastructure and, perhaps
most tragically, tore at the social fabric of the country and
its peoples. The 1995 Dayton Accord brought an end to
the conflict and created a new structure for governing
the country. Local governments are struggling to make
sense of the new political and administrative structures
created by the Accord, as well as manage the tenuous
peace that currently exists. The Canada-Bosnia &
Herzegovina Local and Cantonal Government Cooperation
Program (CBiHCP) – managed by the Canadian Urban
Institute (CUI) with funding from the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) – has been
instrumental in assisting governments in the Tuzla Canton
with improving their capacities to provide services to
communities while building structures for peace and
unity. This project is an excellent example of how devel-
opment cooperation can contribute to fostering peace
and unity in a post-conflict environment.
4 This section was written by Kenneth Bush, Andrew Farncombe, Director of Programming, Canadian Urban Institute and Andrew Plunkett, 
Project Manager, Canadian Urban Institute
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many towns of central Bosnia. Before the violence,
religion did not seem to be the most important
issue in people’s lives; religious attachment has
grown as religion is increasingly linked with 
membership in an ethnic-political group.
Over 250,000 people were killed in the militarized
violence that swept through BiH between 1992 and
1995.5 In a region populated by 4.4 million people,
2.5 million were terrorized and displaced from 
their homes. While all communities were touched
directly by the violence, Muslims were overwhelm-
ingly the largest group of victims. Not all groups
were equally involved in using violence: according
to a UN Commission, 90% of the crimes in BiH
were the responsibility of Serb extremists, 6% by
Croat extremists, and 4% by Muslim extremists.
Ethnic cleansing was a central feature of the
conflict: an objective 
was to create “ethni-
cally pure” Serb and
Croat territories. 
The militarized violence ended with the signing of
the Dayton Accord in November 1995. By this time,
much of the infrastructure in BiH was ravaged:
there was no national bank or common currency
that could be used across ethnic frontiers; rail
connections were broken; over half of the build-
ings in the country were destroyed or damaged; 
an estimated 4 or 5 million unexploded land mines
littered the countryside6 and many industries had
closed or, at best, were operating at minimum
capacity. 
The Dayton Accord created new structures for
governing the country, providing for a single state
for Bosnia and Herzegovina divided into two
halves: (1) the Muslim-Croat Federation, with 
51 percent of the territory, and (2) the Republika
Srpska (Serbian Republic), with 49 percent of the
territory. Republika Srpska is primarily governed
as a unitary entity, although there are 7 adminis-
trative regions. In the Muslim-Croat Federation,
there are ten Cantons: 3 Muslim, 3 Croatian and 
4 mixed. Ethnic segregation still exists despite
efforts to encourage integration, particularly in
mixed Cantons.
Post-conflict reconstruction in the region is highly
political. At a political-economic level, the influx 
of large amounts of money and other resources at
times reinforces the control of warlords and crimi-
nal economies that took root during the militarized
conflict. At the community level, the perception that
one community is benefiting disproportionately has
aggravated inter-group relations. A long-term
Ethnic cleansing included: illegal
internment of the civilian population
in concentration camps; torture; sys-
tematic rape; summary executions;
appropriation and pillage of private
property; systematic destruction of
cultural and religious heritage; using
civilians as human shields on the
front lines and in minefields; mass
starvation; degradation and humilia-
tion; and more.
5 Report to the United Nations by a Special Commission of Experts chaired by Cherif Bassiouni of De Paul University in Chicago. See Florence Hartmann, “Bosnia,” 
in Roy Gutman and David Rieff (eds.) Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (New York: WW Norton & Co., 1999), p. 56.
6 BHMAC (BiH Mine Action Centre) has described BiH as probably the most heavily mined country in Europe, following extensive use of landmines, especially
antipersonnel mines, during the 1991-1995 war. A considerable quantity of unexploded ordnance (UXO) also affects the country. The BHMAC described the situation
as “a threat which is generally low density and random in nature. The total area potentially affected is in the order of 4,000 square kilometers and the bulk of it still
requires survey in order to determine the finite extent of the problem.” By 30 April 2002, BHMAC had recorded 18,228 minefields. However, it estimates the probable
total number to be 30,000, containing approximately one million mines. BHMAC also estimates that two million items of UXO are still unlocated. For a full description
of the landmine problem, see “Mine Situation in BiH,” www.bhmac.org, and “The Mine Problem,” www.bhmac.org/fed/opis.htm. The estimate of one million mines
is based upon 307,000 records in the BHMAC database of mines planted by the Entity Armies. It is estimated the Armies laid 700,000 mines and an estimated 
300,000 mines were laid by civilians without any reporting. “BHMAC Mine Action 2002,” January 2002. www.bhmac.org/bhmac/info/statistics/statistics_e.htm
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challenge for the state-level government is making
sense of the boundaries that divide the Moslem-
Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska: 
current boundaries are the result of diplomatic
negotiations and pressures, ethnic interests and
the need to quickly create cease-fire lines between
communities rather than divisions based on eco-
nomic and administrative logic and priorities.
While on their own local authorities cannot bring
about peace, they have a large role to play in
establishing an environment of unity within and
between different communities. A local government
can have either a negative or positive impact on
peace and unity, by virtue of the degree to which 
it exacerbates, or helps to close, gaps in inequality
between different communities, ethnic groups, or
socio-economic strata. Good governance at the 
local level can help to build peace by nurturing a
culture of unity, diversity, tolerance and fairness,
and through pursuing equitable access to local
government decision-making processes, services
and resources.
The peace in Bosnia remains arguably fragile,
policed by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military
units from NATO and other countries. The civil
aspects of the Dayton Accord are monitored by
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), while
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) organizes elections, and other
international bodies provide humanitarian aid,
assistance for reconstruction, and technical 
cooperation programming. There is great concern
that if international peacekeepers were to leave,
hostilities might start again.
2. Local Governance Context
Long-term peace and stability in BiH depends 
to a significant degree on the effectiveness of 
sub-national government entities. This includes
the Cantonal level of government, which was
established in the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the 1995 Dayton Accord 
(the Republika Srpska does not have a cantonal
level of government). 
The Cantons are organized like the national 
government, with a Governor, a Prime Minister
and sectoral ministers. More than any other level
of government, cantons have benefited both from
the decentralization of power from the State and
the centralization of power from the municipal
level. However, there remains a mixed reaction 
to the establishment of Cantons in the Federation.
Many feel that this level of government was
‘imposed’ from outside, and as such, it has mixed 
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support among government officials. One of the
main issues is that, while municipal governments
were well established in Bosnia, there was little 
or no history of regional governance, and the
fledgling cantonal administrations have demon-
strated this with their share of growing pains. 
Nevertheless, the Cantons appear to have the
most important responsibilities of all four levels 
of government: they have taken over many of the
major powers of local municipalities and have
been given some authority previously exercised 
by the State itself. Cantonal responsibilities
include the majority of powers in: education, 
culture, health, housing, communications, water
systems, police, local economic development
(including tourism development and regulation 
of local businesses), taxation (although personal
income tax is a function of the two entities) and
regulation of land use (including zoning). 
Although on paper cantons are responsible for
most local activities, there is a tradition of strong
local government in BiH and municipalities are
often still more directly relevant in the day-to-day
lives of citizens. The powers left to municipalities
by the Dayton Accord were somewhat undefined
at first, and powers continue to vary, as each 
cantonal government makes its own decisions
about  which responsibilities it delegates to munici-
palities. Most municipalities, however, are involved
in: local planning; housing; fire protection; water
and sewer services and humanitarian activities.
Some municipal revenues are generated locally
but most come from a proportion of Cantonal
sales, payroll and profit taxes. The greatest diffi-
culty in setting up effective governments is in the
mixed cantons, where parallel organizations are
developing alongside ethnically based political
parties. 
One of the greatest challenges for local governments
in BiH is to make the decentralized governance
system decreed by the Dayton Accord operational
and effective. This will require: clarification of the
division of responsibilities between the Federation,
cantons and municipalities; promotion of inter-
governmental cooperation; developing new systems
for generating economic development and revenue;
and establishing effective and up-to-date methods
of delivering local services. Specifically, local
authorities need to develop their understanding 
of the principles and practices, structures and
processes for governing democratically within 
a market economy. 
3. Project Description
The Canada-Bosnia & Herzegovina Local and
Cantonal Government Cooperation Programme
(CBiHCP) is a capacity building program aimed at
improving urban management in the Tuzla Canton
of BiH. It is funded by the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) and managed by 
the Canadian Urban Institute (CUI). Key project
partners and participants include the Urban
Institute of Tuzla (the primary implementing and
coordinating partner), Tuzla Canton, the City of
Tuzla and the other 12 municipalities in the Canton,
the Economic Institute of Tuzla, the University of
Tuzla, and civil society groups (NGOs, CBOs and
private sector organizations) active in the Canton.
While the primary beneficiaries are the Tuzla Canton
and the 13 constituent municipalities (including 
the City of Tuzla), the CBiHCP is supporting the
development of a model approach that could be
used by other governments in both the Federation
and Republika Srpska. 
The project is aimed at promoting good gover-
nance in BiH, within the context of an emerging
democratic system and market-based economy,
by building the capabilities of local governments 
in strategic urban management. CBiHCP provides
assistance to enable local governments to open
their decision making processes in developing 
and implementing plans for growth and develop-
ment. The project is an important step towards
tackling several challenges associated with
decentralization and establishing an effective 
system of local gover-
nance, including:
• Helping to innovate
ways to make the
decentralized governance system 
decreed by the Dayton Accord 
operational and effective;
• Developing mechanisms for intergovernmental
cooperation at the local level;
• Assisting with the transition at the local level 
to market-based economic systems and 
promotion of local economic development;
• Developing a better understanding of the 
principles and practices of governing demo-
cratically among local authorities (cantonal
and municipal);
• Improving revenue generation opportunities 
for local governments;
• Establishing effective and up-to-date methods
of delivering local services; and
• Finding ways to improve local decision making
to take into account the strategic expenditure
of limited resources to tackle the reconstruc-
tion of basic infrastructure and housing, and
provide key social services.
Project Location: Tuzla Canton and 
Municipality of Tuzla
The Tuzla Canton in northeastern BiH has a popu-
lation of approximately 580,000, including over
80,000 refugees who are mostly Muslims displaced
from territory now under the jurisdiction of the
Republika Srpska [iv]. Tuzla was an important
industrial centre and site of the largest chemical
industrial complex in the former Yugoslavia. 
The municipality of Tuzla is the fourth largest city
in BiH, with a population of 160,000 including
45,000 refugees. Prior to the conflict, the city was
ethnically mixed with about 50 percent of the pop-
ulation Muslim and approximately equal numbers
of Serbs and Croats. Today, as a result of the influx
of displaced Muslims, over 70 percent of Tuzla’s
population is Muslim, about 17 percent is Croat
and only 9 percent is Serb.
The Tuzla cantonal government has a great
amount of power on paper, but is only gradually
developing the resources to properly undertake its
new responsibilities. Many smaller communities in
the canton are isolated and poor. Industrial pro-
duction is slowly recovering after the conflict,
though many plants have not reopened. The air-
port has reopened for peacekeeping purposes, 
but currently has very limited civilian use, and the
rail connections are in the process of being re-
established. There is a major housing shortage 
in many parts of the canton due to the numbers 
of refugees. In the north, there is an unresolved
border dispute with the Republika Srpska. Major
government challenges include: economic devel-
opment, water and waste systems, transportation
and housing. Cantonal leaders put the moderniza-
tion of administrative structures and resources
and the establishment of clear and collaborative
relationships with the Federation and local gov-
ernments as high priorities.
Role of Local Government in the Project 
Strengthening local government is a central ele-
ment of CBiHCP design. The project’s intended
impact is more transparent, accountable and effi-
cient local government institutions in Tuzla Canton.
The project is designed to achieve this through
four anticipated outcomes:
• More effective, transparent and participatory
planning processes in Tuzla Canton.
• Enhanced commitment of local government
authorities in the Canton to democratic and
participatory principles and practices in local
governance, planning, and decision-making. 
• Enhanced enabling environment for local
government, civil society, and private sector
partnerships for implementation of cantonal
development plans.
• Increased and effective participation and voice
by Tuzla Canton citizens in local governance
and development planning processes.
The advantage of decentraliza-
tion is that it allows decisions
to be made at a local level by
authorities that are sensitive to
the interests and attitudes of
the community they represent.
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4. Good Practice in Local Governance 
& Peacebuilding
The CBiHCP has exemplified and/or contributed 
to good practice in linking local governance and
peace-building in a number of important ways:
Bringing government and basic service 
delivery closer to citizens. The project is prima-
rily about developing innovative ways to make the
decentralized governance system operational and
effective. This has included the promotion of public
participation, greater transparency, and multi-
stakeholder processes in local and regional gover-
nance. It is important to note that devolving decision-
making authority to local levels decreases the 
distance between decision-maker and community,
and decision and impact, and as such, local 
governments have a key role to play in closing
these gaps. Decentralization will not promote
peace-building in and of itself; however, by
opening up decision making to greater
scrutiny, and by involving the public 
and a variety of stakeholders in 
government processes, there will
exist a greater opportunity for peace
through greater transparency.
Modeling ideals through leadership at the
local level. The City of Tuzla has had a long 
tradition of inter-ethnic tolerance and coopera-
tion, which is being put to the test by the arrival
of thousands of embittered survivors of atrocities
from places like Srebrenica.7 While the cantonal
government is firmly in the hands of a Bosniak
party, relative to other cantons in BiH, Tuzla
remains a model of inter-ethnic calm.
Leadership in the Tuzla region is based on core ideals,
and this has been exemplified by the former mayor
and governor of Tuzla, Selim Beslagic. During the
first phase of the project, Beslagic came to power
with support from all ethnic groups. His first objective
was to see Tuzla become the model of a modern, 
tolerant, progressive municipality which would
benefit from experience elsewhere and be a bea-
con for the rest of the country. The credibility 
and integrity of the Mayor inspired and mobilized
citizens under very difficult circumstances. While
Beslagic has led the way (as both Mayor and
Governor of Tuzla) with his inter-ethnic platform,
the project benefited from other inter-ethnic (in
composition and orientation) partners, including
the staff of the municipality and Urban Institute 
of Tuzla, both which still consist of people from 
all ethnic groups. 
7 For an account of the “fall” of Srebrenica see Charles Lane, “Dateline Zagreb: The Fall of Srebrenica”, in Dat Nader Mousavizadeh,
ed., The Black Book of Bosnia; the Consequences of Appeasement (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 116-124.
8 Data collected from the Spatial Plan for Tuzla Canton, Ministry of Physical Planning and Environmental Protection, Tuzla Canton,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003.
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Supporting local leaders as champions.
A champion is someone who, through moral 
influence, quiet diplomacy, public presence, or
skillful negotiation and maneuvering, is able to
positively affect the thinking and behaviour of
groups and individuals. By changing individuals and
groups, champions induce structural changes in
economic, political, and social systems. A champion
is usually someone who already has a positive
profile in the community, who knows the rules 
of the game and wants change that contributes
to peace and unity. Champions are particularly
important in environments characterized by dis-
trust, such as post-conflict settings. The CBiHCP
has supported leadership development through
targeted capacity development aimed at building
the knowledge and skills of local officials in the
principles of good governance, including partici-
patory planning, strategic planning, and integrated
approaches to complex local problems. 
Local Champions: 
Selim Beslagic
When he was elected Mayor  of Tuzla in 1990,
Selim Beslagic became the first democratically
elected, non-nationalistic Mayor in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the post-communist era. His Social
Democrat Party (SDP) formed a multi-ethnic gov-
ernment of moderates committed to free market
development and political reform. During his term
as Mayor, Beslagic was able to deflect the tide of
ethnic-nationalism that swept through the former
Yugoslavia during the conflict that followed its
break-up in 1991. His policies have served as a
benchmark of good governance, democracy and
ethnic coexistence at the local level. His efforts to
maintain peace and civility during the 1992-1995
aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the
survival of his city as a bastion of tolerant and
democratic relations among citizens, and has
earned him international recognition and numerous
awards, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace
Prize. After serving as Mayor
for ten years, he spent one
term as Governor of the Tuzla
Canton. Currently, Mr. Beslagic
is a Member of Parliament for
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ensuring sustainability. The CBiHCP tried to
establish mechanisms to integrate project man-
agement structures into local decision-making
processes in the Institute for Urbanism Tuzla, the
Municipality of Tuzla and the Tuzla Canton. Local
professionals and institutions are actively involved
in the delivery of this project, which contributes to
strengthening the capacity of local organizations.
All project work is overseen by the Project Steering
Committee, made up of representatives of all three
levels of government in the Federation, as well as
members of other Tuzla Canton agencies, interna-
tional agencies, and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Local management support is provided by 
an Executive Committee, made up of members
from all partner organizations, including the Urban
Institute of Tuzla, University of Tuzla, and Tuzla Canton
Ministry of Physical Planning and Environmental
Protection. The executive committee meets every
other week to design and review workplans and 
to monitor progress. Committee management and
local ownership are examples of good practice
because they ensure that the project is driven 
by local priorities and context, and contribute to
long-term sustainability.
Organizing study tours and professional
exchanges. The CBiHCP has made use of study
tours (group learning sessions to other countries)
and professional exchanges in the capacity devel-
opment dimension of the project. Study tours and
two-way professional exchanges can make impor-
tant strategic and catalytic contributions to peace
and unity by nurturing personal and professional
relationships, thereby breaking down barriers cre-
ated by conflict. Study tours remove people from
the stresses of working and living in highly politi-
cized and segregated environments. Individuals
who might not otherwise meet are brought into a
neutral environment of professional development
and learning. In addition to study tours to Canada,
the CBiHCP supported east-east study tours: an
exchange with Hungary enabled BiH participants to
learn more about Hungarian efforts to join the EU.
Supporting community-based initiatives. Also
noteworthy in CBiHCP is the establishment of a
local development fund: ten percent of the project
budget has been set aside for a Fund to support
local initiatives. The fund was established to pro-
vide seed funding to small-scale initiatives aimed
at enhancing local governance, policymaking, and
service delivery in Tuzla Canton. Through the
strategic allocation of seed money, the fund is
intended to build positive momentum and energies,
increase local ownership of the project, promote
sustainability of initiatives, reward innovative
approaches to problem solving, and build the
capacity of local groups to design and manage
projects in a results-based manner. 
Sharing project experiences across BiH.
Experiences from the CBiHCP are intended to serve
as models and inspiration for other local govern-
ments in the Federation and Republika Srpska. 
The CBiHCP has made special efforts to bring 
professionals from the Republika Srpska as well
as other cantons in the Federation into all of its
outreach activities (training exercises, workshops,
presentations etc.). The CBiHCP is also working
with the Bosnian Association of Urbanists, which
draws its membership from both the Federation
and Republika Srpska. The incorporation of
Republika Srpska participants has created a new
space within which they can imagine how such a
project might be established in their political and
social context. The inter-ethnic networks that
evolved out of these events have created a pool of
ideas, expertise and trust that may be harnessed
and applied to replication efforts. However, poten-
tial replication of project experiences will require
creative review and modification to suit local 
contexts.
Supporting transition to a free market economy.
The CBiHCP has placed significant emphasis on
supporting the transition towards a free market
economy. In the immediate post-war context of
BiH, there was very little interaction across entity
borders other than one place in a de-mined field,
the Arizona market between the Republika Srpska
and the Federation. Unfortunately, while conflict
itself had created an economic structure that 
provided goods and services to local populations,
this structure was anything but a model of free
market competition: it reinforced politico-military
war lord fiefdoms and sustained a network of self-
enriching middle-men. However, eight years after
its establishment, there has been no significant
confrontation between ethnic groups in the market.
Notwithstanding the trade in black market goods,
within the Arizona market lies a clue to rebuilding
Bosnia’s multi-ethnic society.
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The Tuzla Canton, the City of Tuzla and the munici-
palities within the Canton, all recognize that gray
and black markets in goods and services repre-
sent losses of potential tax revenue. Therefore,
they all have institutional interests in moving
towards more transparent systems of economic
transaction. Still, the sensitivities and volatility of
post-war settings require that any move towards
economic regularization and formalization be
planned and implemented very carefully: it is a
process of identifying and creating incentives 
for engagements in free market activity, and 
disincentives for anti-free market activities. 
CBiHCP suggests two mechanisms for working
within systems struggling to overcome the legacy
of dirty war economies: (1) relying on champions
and (2) emphasizing public participation, particu-
larly in strategic planning. As noted above, the
CBiHCP benefited immensely from its champion
in the Mayor of the City of Tuzla. In addition to
cultivating governance capacities within civil soci-
ety and creating opportunities for those capacities
to be exercised, CBiHCP also supports efforts to
increase public participation. This serves a moni-
toring function in the decision making process, 
by increasing scrutiny and transparency in gov-
ernment processes, which helps keep officials
accountable and increases investor confidence.
5. Lessons Learned
Governance and peacebuilding initiatives 
take a long, long time.
No project that addresses and/or relies on the
linking of governance and peace-building will
work unless it is given time. Building a foundation
of trust is a critical element of project success,
and it takes time to develop trusting relationships
between: project partners; partners and communi-
ties; governments; governments and civil society;
civil society groups. A critical element of trust-
building process is physical presence. Shifting in
and out of a project site undercuts the ability to
build deep-rooted trust. Long-term commitment is
as important as physical presence: most residents
in conflict-prone areas have seen humanitarian
and development actors come and go, projects
start and close. The people of BiH are perhaps
more aware than other war-affected communities
of the capriciousness of donor commitments (diplo-
matic, military, developmental, and humanitarian). 
Decentralization requires sustained support.
The greatest challenge for local governments in
BiH is to make the decentralized governance sys-
tem decreed by the Dayton Accord operational and
effective. The cantonal government has a great
amount of power on paper but is only gradually
developing the resources to properly undertake its
responsibilities. Local authorities struggle with the
difficult challenge of building local economies in
order to deal with poverty and to improve the
delivery of essential urban services. If they are to
meet these challenges, local governments will
have to make important changes in governance
methods and modes of thinking.
Partnerships are important. 
Tuzla has been able to capitalize on a variety of
partnerships in its pursuit of improved local gover-
nance and development planning for the region.
Because so many issues cross over jurisdictional
boundaries, it is difficult if not impossible for
municipalities to solve most problems on their
own. Leadership and championship drive the
process of development. Tuzla benefited from
strong local leadership among elected officials,
who championed and stewarded a difficult
process of change in institutional practices and
mindsets. This has allowed the region to emerge
as a pioneer and model in local governance and
local government management.
Diversity of ethnicity is not a problem, 
but rather an opportunity.
The recent history of the Tuzla region has demon-
strated that, with determination and focus, a multi-
ethnic society can be united. It can work together
to harness its different strengths toward common
goals.
Consolidated action plans based on a solid 
strategic plan can move forward development.
Tuzla placed an emphasis on first developing a
comprehensive understanding of itself and its
issues, second translating this understanding into
consensus on the future through a solid strategic
planning framework, and third through developing
concrete plans of action on priority matters. This
methodology has given local governments a tool 
to bring about change.
We can learn from other places.
Tuzla has networked with cities and municipalities
from around Europe and North America. This has
allowed it to learn from and be inspired by the
successes and failures of others.
Listening and communicating is the beginning 
of solving problems.
Local governments in the Tuzla region took seriously
the need to consult with and involve their citizens.
This was an important first step in moving away
from the old way of doing things and moving
towards bringing in a new approach to tackling
local problems.
Citizens must have ownership or at least believe
they have influence within the local government
process.
Without citizens feeling they are part of determining
their own path to the future, they cannot be expect-
ed to contribute to achieving that desired future.
Elected officials must earn the trust 
of the citizenry.
Taxpayers are entitled to know exactly how their
tax dollars are spent. For this to happen, the public
must demand and be given transparency and
accountability by local elected officials.
Local governments can play a role 
in strengthening civil society.
Bosnia has had good experiences in recent years
in harnessing the power of people through building
and strengthening non-governmental and communi-
ty-based organizations. A strong and active civil
society can help local politicians to govern. Muni-
cipalities have it within their power to strengthen
the voice and advocacy of their communities.
Big problems seem insurmountable, but can be 
broken down into manageable segments.
Immediately after the conflict, the challenge of
rebuilding and developing the Tuzla region was
enormous. Prioritization of the problems to tackle
first was difficult. And prospects for improving the
quality of life seemed almost unattainable. The use
of participatory strategic planning provided the
mechanism for finding consensus among various
players on these difficult tradeoffs.
The process of privatizing state-owned facilities
must result in a dividend being paid back to 
communities.
This is especially true of industries that produce
environmental or social externalities. For example,
there is a need to find a model whereby the local
authority receives royalty, compensation or rev-
enue from any privatized industry that continues 
to pollute.
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Palestinian Municipal Management Programme (PMMP)9
Case Study 2
1. Peacebuilding & Unity Context
Civilians are the principal victims in the 
ebb and flow of militarized
violence in Israel, the
occupied West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and
Palestinian Authority
Territories. Conflict has
been marked by attacks
on civilians and civilian
objects by both Israeli
security forces and
Palestinian armed
groups. Over seven 
hundred Palestinian and 
two hundred Israeli children, women, and men
civilians were killed in 2001, and some 16,000
Palestinians and 1,700 Israelis were injured 10.
Targeting civilians is a breach
of the laws of armed conflict:
“The civilian population as
such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object
of attack. Acts or threaths of
violence the primary purpose
of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population 
is prohibited.” Protocol 1
Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (adopted
June 1977). Israel has not 
ratified this Protocol, but, as
customary law it is universally
applicable regardless of 
ratification.
9 This section was written by Kenneth Bush, with input from the Middle-East Programme team at FCM.
10 Human Rights Watch Annual Rpt 2001.
ABSTRACT
The ongoing violent confrontations between Israelis and
Palestinians are having devastating social, economic and
political effects in Palestinian society. Palestinian municipal-
ities, the only level of government that is still functioning,
face enormous challenges as they try to provide leadership
and basic services to their constituents. The Palestinian
Territories Municipal Management Programme (PMMP) is
working with the Rafah municipality to build capacity and
enhance public participation in municipal management. The
PMMP is an example of a project that is making a positive
contribution to the peace and unity environment, as well as
an example of a project that is hindered and limited by a
continuing conflict situation that it alone cannot stop.
In response to the conflict situation, the Israeli
army has taken a number of measures: imposing 
a strict closure on the Territories; restricting the
mobility of goods and people; and refusing to
transfer money owing to Palestinians. A network
of over 20 fixed and mobile military check points
on main roads has divided the Gaza Strip into
three sections, preventing people and goods from
moving freely within, and into and out of, Gaza.
From a peace and unity perspective, closures 
cut constructive link-
ages between Israelis 
and Palestinians and 
escalate tensions and
extremism on both sides.
The economic conse-
quences on the lives,
livelihoods, and health of
Palestinians have been 
devastating. The situation has reduced economic
productivity and access to basic services and has
increased production costs and unemployment.
Poverty levels in the Gaza Strip have been tradi-
tionally high and the situation has seriously
worsened since the start of the uprising. Palestinians
who work in Israel have not been allowed to travel
to work resulting in a sharp drop in the income
level of many Palestinians. Real per capita income
has dropped by at least 30% compared to 1994 
levels. In the West Bank and Gaza, the number of
poor (defined as those with a consumption of less
than US $2 per day) rose sharply from 0.6 million 
in September 2000 to 1.5 million by the end of 2001. 
The World Bank estimates that it will take the
Palestinian Authority (PA) several years to return
to the pre-crisis level of economic activity and real
per capita income. 80 percent of PA revenues
come from indirect taxes on consumption. Since
December 2000, Israel has refused to transfer to
the PA funds that are collected by the Israeli Tax
Administration but which accrue to the PA through
the Revenue Clearance System. At the end of 2001,
this was estimated at US $ 507 million. 
The violent confrontations have not only caused
major economic problems but have also resulted
in serious damage to economic assets, personal
and public properties and infrastructure. Damage
has been reported in all sectors: water, waste-
water, solid waste, electricity, agriculture and
roads. The destruction of infrastructure and 
services has led to a substantial increase in the
cost of service delivery and, in many cases, to the
break down in service delivery altogether. As the
PA capacity for service provision is destroyed by
systematic IDF attacks, civilian populations are
increasingly dependent on support from social 
and charitable sub-organizations of extremist
political-military groups. The support base and
institutional strength of these groups are thus
deepened, and the net result is anti-peace and
anti-unity. 
Unity because of Adversity:
Because of Israeli closures,
the municipality of Khan Yunis
had no access to its landfill
site. In response, the nearby
community of Rafah opened its
landfill site to Khan Yunis at no
cost. The degree to which this
contributed to increased unity
and cooperation depends on
whether such cooperation
spilled over into other sectors
and areas of activity. 27
2. Local Governance Context
The development of effective public institutions
was a major goal of the PA prior to the uprising,
and a good deal of progress had been made in
establishing institutional frameworks, increasing
skills and capacity, clarifying legislative and legal
frameworks, and strengthening financial systems.
In addition, major progress had been made in
strengthening local government institutions and
services. The Palestinian Ministry of Local
Government (MLG) has the mandate
to establish a system of
local government
that not only 
has the capacity to provide for its residents but is 
also transparent, accountable, and responsive. 
In addition, the MLG has been tasked with the
responsibility of advancing administrative and
financial decentralization as well as rebuilding
infrastructure and services.
Unfortunately, the violent conflicts between
Palestinian and Israeli entities have brought the
Palestinian economy to almost a complete halt.
Gains that have been achieved over the years are
dwindling away. Palestinian institutions, including
the police and the judiciary, are on the verge of
collapse. Their capacity to provide public services
and maintain development projects has been 
seriously curtailed. Basic services such as water
supply, road networks, electricity grids, health 
and educational facilities have been disrupted
or discontinued. 
Local government continues to provide leadership
and basic services to its population. Nevertheless,
years of neglect and Israeli occupation have 
inundated municipalities in the Palestinian
Territories with enormous
challenges. Some of the
constraints they face
include lack of resources,
high poverty levels, lack
of skilled manpower, a
growing refugee problem,
poor information networks,
a lack of basic infrastructure, a weak and unclear
institutional structure and a high degree of central
government control. Further aggravating the situa-
tion is the physical deterioration of the territories
as well as the continuing political and economic
uncertainty and instability that characterize the
region.
3. Project Description
As part of the CIDA’s on-going support to develop-
ment in the Palestinian Territories, the Palestinian
Municipal Management Project (PMMP) was
developed in partnership with the Federation 
of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) to help the 
MLG achieve its goals. Implemented by FCM’s
International Centre for Municipal Development
(FCM-ICMD), PMMP aimed to improve the man-
agement capacity and enhance the level of public
participation in municipal management, with a
view to increasing the ability of municipalities in
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Support should focus equally
on the leadership roles of
municipalities during the 
violence as after it. Leadership
and management capacities
during violent conflict, are 
not only useful in post-conflict
settings, they are critical for
nurturing the structures and
processes that create peace.
the Palestinian Territories to provide for basic
human needs. PMMP has focused on one munici-
pality in particular, Rafah, in the Gaza Strip.
Project activities were delivered at three levels:
the community, the municipality of Rafah and the
MLG. Activities at all levels were interrelated to
support and reinforce capacity building and public
participation initiatives. The community level 
component was designed to enhance linkages
between community-based groups and the munici-
pality, and to assist local groups in improving the
quality of life in Rafah through the implementation
of the Local Initiative Support Fund and develop-
ment education activities. The municipal level
component was designed to assist Rafah with
improving its municipal management systems and
increasing public involvement in data manage-
ment, strategic and long-term planning, solid
waste and water management, institutional capac-
ity building and gender development. The MLG
component was designed to increase the capacity
of the Ministry to assist Palestinian municipalities
in improving their municipal service delivery, dis-
seminate best practices and coordinate training
programs. 
The implementation of the project started in 1998,
and considerable strides were initially made, 
contributing to improved management capacity 
of Rafah municipality and increased levels of 
public participation. After the violent uprising in
September 2000, the project faced a number of
delays and was finally completed in June 2002. 
Key activities of the PMMP include: 
• Establishing a data bank and training decision
makers to ensure its effective use. 
• Preparing an official municipal plan, including
training of officials in Rafah as well as those
from other municipalities.
• Improving solid waste management. Municipal
staff was trained in the skills required to pre-
pare and implement operational plans in solid
waste management and obtain active public
participation. This enhanced the municipal
capacity to engage the public in waste man-
agement programs/ activities /awareness.
• Environmental impact assessment training.
Municipal officials were trained in EIA to
enhance the capacity of municipal officials 
to consider and interpret the environmental
impact of digging water wells.
• Financial management and analysis training for
municipal officials to improve their capacity to
prepare budgets and use accounting systems.
• Leadership, management and capacity building.
This involved: enhancing municipal senior 
managers’ skills in identifying leadership train-
ing and strategic planning needs; improving
leadership skills to strategically plan and man-
age; enhancing municipal and MLG officials’
skills in preparing operational plans, assessing
performance, developing policy documents and
providing services; and developing policies,
processes and plans to guide management
process.
• Establishing a Local Initiatives Support Fund to
strengthen the capacity of local neighbourhood
committees and linkages between community
groups and the municipality, so as to improve
services to the community and increase public
participation. 
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Project Location: Rafah Municipality
The City of Rafah was selected given Canada’s
long history of involvement in providing support 
to Palestinian refugees. Rafah is located at the
southern end of the Gaza Strip, which gives it
strategic importance. Over the past twenty years,
the city has grown dramatically, both as a result 
of a large number of refugees and a high natural
growth rate. Approximately 70 per cent of Rafa’s
residents live in refugee camps. 
Rafa’s proximity to the Mediterranean Sea, Gaza
International Airport and the planned development
of the Free Zone Industrial Estates provides for
significant economic and social development
potential. Yet, political uncertainty and the muni-
cipal government’s inability to use existing
resources hinder this potential. This situation 
is exacerbated by the presence of Israeli settle-
ments and the land distribution under Palestinian
and Israeli control, which make it difficult to have
effective influence over resources and land use.
Like other Palestinian municipalities, Rafah
was faced with many 
challenges: increasing
financial resources,
reducing poverty,
increasing skilled man-
power, addressing 
the refugee problem,
improving information 
networks, developing basic infrastructure,
strengthening institutional structures and 
decentralizing government systems. 
A second phase of the project is now beginning,
and will focus on both Rafah and Khan Yunis
municipalities. Khan Yunis neighbors Rafah, 
and shares many demographic and economic 
indicators.
Role of Local Government in the Project
Despite what may seem to be a daunting task,
there is a strong political will to establish a system
of local government in the PA that is both decen-
tralized and democratic. The PMMP supports 
and reinforces existing political willingness by
enhancing municipal management capacity and
public participation in decision making.
PMMP is now in its second phase (2003-2006),
which will build on the successes and lessons
learned from phase I. PMMP is focused on the
role of municipalities in dealing with the current
conflict situation as well as addressing the devel-
opment priorities of their communities. The project’s
goal is to support peace and development initiatives
to improve the quality of life and achieve sustain-
able communities in the Palestinian municipalities
of Rafah and Khan Yunis. The intended outcomes
of PMMP include: 
• increased municipal capacity to design and
implement local economic development 
programs and poverty reduction initiatives;
• increased accessibility to municipal services
and infrastructure;
• community members, especially women,
actively involved in reconstruction and in
municipal affairs and decision making;
• more effective municipal government in
addressing emergencies; and
• increased capacity of MLG to support 
municipal government services and functions.
The impact of the last 18
months of violence on Rafah
has been dramatic: 85% of the
population is not able to pay
municipal fees and charges;
86% of the population cannot
pay electricity charges; and
45% of the population is with-
out any source of income.
(World Bank)
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4. Good Practice in Local Governance 
& Peacebuilding
The design and implementation of the PMMP
presents a number of examples of good practices
in the context of peacebuilding & unity:
Emphasize devolution of power to the local
level. The project made considerable strides and
contributed to improving the management capacity
of Rafah municipality and increasing levels of public
participation. In PMMP, all control, monitoring, and
delivery rest at the municipal level. 
Build capacity and leadership abilities of
local government. Local government continues
to provide leadership and basic services to its
population, however, cash shortages and a lack of
resources are increasingly crippling the capacity
of municipalities to deliver services. In order to
strengthen the municipality’s leadership role, 
a core group of 22 municipal staff were trained to
be agents of change and lead development efforts
in Rafah. Training helped improve competencies,
apply system thinking and strategic planning con-
cepts to real issues, develop programs, policies,
and solutions to address priority objectives and
use the legislative and management tools avail-
able to better achieve a vision for their city and
organization. 
Actively involve citizens in municipal 
planning and decision-making. Ensuring
effective and active co-operation with all 
stakeholders is a means of promoting accounta-
bility and monitoring cost-effective implementa-
tion. Public participation has been sought in data
collection, the implementation of solid waste pilot
projects, environmental impact assessments and
the visioning exercises. Under PMMP, Rafah staff
capacity to articulate their vision of the future 
and solicit community participation has improved.
Rafah Strategic Directions 2015 was prepared and
adopted by council to guide future development
efforts, and in 1999, approximately 500 people 
from all sectors of the community participated 
in a series of public consultation meetings. The
credibility and transparency of the community
consultation process were ensured by commu-
nicating the results of the public consultations
back to them.
The collection and use of data is very political and
can therefore increase tensions: data can be used
to monitor and control populations, to extract
resources (e.g., through taxes) and to allocate
public resources (creating fear in some groups
that they may lose out). However, to the extent
that the collection and use of data is participatory
and transparent, while protecting rights of privacy,
it can contribute to increased planning and decision-
making capacity as well as increased trust and
accountability within and between state-like
authorities and civil society. 
Support community ownership of develop-
ment activities. PMMP encouraged local owner-
ship and empowerment of the community through
the provision of funds to support local NGOs for
small community service projects. Eight locally 
identified projects were implemented and completed
in Rafah. The guidelines and the functioning of the
Local Initiatives Support Fund have provided a
useful model for community development initia-
tives that empower local institutions and foster
linkages between key actors in communities. 
Support cooperation at different levels of govern-
ment. The Project is a combination of components
at the municipal, community and ministry levels.
Activities at all levels are interrelated to support
and reinforce capacity-building and public parti-
cipation initiatives. The incorporation of senior
officials from other municipalities serves to
increase the pool of ideas and inputs into the 
planning process, and, from a peace and unity
perspective, may also strengthen personal and
professional linkages in the Palestinian Territories,
thereby contributing to solidarity and unity building
between separated communities. 
Enable access to scarce resources. Access 
to water is one of the most volatile and political
issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because
of its scarcity and Israel’s dependence on the 
subterranean water supply of the West Bank11.
Conflict has been intertwined with water disputes,
and occupation of the West Bank allows the Israeli
state to control vital water supplies that originate
in the West Bank but are consumed for the most
part in Israel. In this context, Environmental
Impact Assessment capacity, as developed in the
PMMP, may contribute to ecological sustainability.
In addition to these good practices, the PMMP
has also been successful in how it has:
• given Rafah’s leaders and citizens tools and
processes to respond to challenges and
improve municipal governance, as well as
physical and tangible products to demonstrate
positive changes;
• capitalized on strong political will to 
support local government development 
and decentralization; 
• made on-going investments in training and
capacity building; and
• been sensitive to local sensibilities by 
introducing new and progressive ideas that 
are relevant and applicable to local culture 
and conditions.
5. Lessons Learned
The peace and conflict environment in Israel and
the Palestinian territories is characterized by 
violent conflict that has escalated out of control.
The impact on the capacity of local government to
function effectively has been dramatic. Palestinian
institutions, including the police and the judiciary,
are on the verge of collapse. Their capacity to pro-
vide public services and maintain development
projects has been seriously curtailed. Basic 
services such as water supply, road networks,
electricity grids, health and educational facilities
have been disrupted or discontinued. The destruc-
tion of infrastructure and services has led to a
substantial increase in the cost of service delivery
and, in many cases, ultimately to the break down
in service delivery altogether. 
The protracted conflict has made it difficult to
focus on long-term development objectives. Thus,
the primary focus of the PMMP was initiating and
implementing responsive emergency projects,
while maintaining a vision and framework for
longer-term capacity development. Peace and
development objectives remain the framework 
for the PMMP. Support to Palestinian municipalities
at this stage will prepare them to take a leadership
role once the violence ends. Moreover, it will sup-
port their emergency and reconstruction efforts 
in the short-term (services, employment opportu-
nities, etc.) as well as provide them with the
capacity to plan for future development.
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11 For further information see: Miriam R. Lowi (1993). “Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water,” 
International Security, 18:1 (Summer), pp. 113-138 and Diane Raines Ward, Water Wars: Drought, Flood, Folly & the Politics of Thirst (London: Riverhead, 2003)].
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Zones of Peace Project12
Case Study 3
1. Peacebuilding & Unity Context13
The socio-political context of the proposed sites
for the Zones of Peace (ZOP) project reflects 
the complexity of the Philippine geography – 
an archipelago with differing concentrations of 
conflict and social organization, where even the
history of peace negotiations is disjointed and
diverse. Mindanao’s Muslim (or Moro) and indige-
nous Lumad peoples, now outnumbered by majo-
rity Filipinos – the largely Christian descendants 
of 20th century settlers from the northern and 
central Philippines – are asserting rights to 
their traditional lands and to self-determination. 
12 This section was written by Kenneth Bush, with input from Myn Garcia.
13 This section draws directly from the comprehensive report prepared by Conciliation Resources (1999). 
ABSTRACT
Zones of Peace are part of the effort to halt armed hostilities
in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, the Philippines.
They are also an effort to lay the groundwork for pluralism
and dialogue at the local level and pursue a development
agenda based on a community’s own terms. The Zones of
Peace project was designed to support the establishment 
of social spaces within which conflict affected communities
can identify and resolve problems in culturally appropriate
non-violent ways. The project had two components: capacity
building and community based planning. The utility of consid-
ering both components of the project is that it allows us to
make the critical links between the support and cultivation 
of local peacebuilding resources on the one hand, and their
application, on the other. 
The material presented in this case study is drawn from a 
limited number of project documents and related materials.
The central focus of the case study is a project proposal,
rather than an actual project. While the case study follows
the same format of the others in this collection, it illustrates
how a peace and unity lens may be used to sift through and
critically assess project proposals.
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) resorted
to a war for independence in the 1970s, after
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law. Meanwhile, a communist-led rebellion
spread from the northern Philippines to Mindanao,
drawing in many
majority Filipinos,
particularly
among the rural
poor, and some
Lumads into the
New People’s
Army (NPA).
Moro rebellion
has been
explained as a
response to the
forcible annexation and consequent historical
injustice by Islamicized ethno-linguistic groups 
in Mindanao.
September 1996 is a critical date on the 
path towards lasting peace in the Philippines
because that was when the Mindanao 
Peace Agreement was signed between 
former President Ramos
and the Governor of the
Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao. All
previous attempts to
negotiate an end to the
24 years of civil war – 
in which over 120,000
people died – had failed to define a sustainable
settlement. After the Agreement, both the
Government and local leaders seemed genuinely
committed to post-conflict reconstruction for
peace and development in Mindanao, especially 
in the Special Zone of Peace and Development
(SZOPAD). 
In mid-2000, full scale war began again in
Mindanao, fully destroying the ceasefires with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and MNLF.
Militarized vio-
lence devastated
already weak-
ened levels of
agricultural pro-
duction, infra-
structure, and
economic devel-
opment.
Many scholars argue that the
Mindanao conflicts are not fueled 
by religious differences, though the 
Muslim and Christian vigilante groups
appeared and attacked the other com-
munities and places of worship. The
economic and political deprivations of
minorization (relative deprivations, loss
of ancestral domains, militarization 
and Rights violations) are more often
identified as underlying causes of the
conflict. More recently, emphasis has
been placed on the cultural dimension:
competing world views, ways of life
and values related to land ownership,
governance and justice.
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Like all peace processes, the government-MNLF process was distinctively creative in its design and implemen-
tation. The strategies the parties pursued in the four years of negotiations show a commendable approach to
peacemaking — in their commitment to maintaining multiple channels of dialogue and communication, in their
approach to institutionalising communication and negotiations and through the use of informal networks. The
Ramos government’s approach to negotiations (defined as the ‘Six Paths to Peace’) is an example of enormous
international value in rhetorical intent and practice. Yet despite a negotiating process exemplary in so many
ways, the resulting settlement has appeared vulnerable from the start. The much vaunted ‘consensus and 
consultations’ were largely limited to the negotiating parties, except for a few token efforts to communicate 
with civil society organizations. Thus both parties found it difficult to persuade a wider public of the wisdom 
of the deal when its terms were finally announced.
The 1996 Peace Agreement should not
have been expected to end violence in
Mindanao. The MNLF was only one of
several groups that had taken up arms
against the Philippine government. 
The others included the MILF, the much
smaller Abu Sayyaf and Islamic Command
Council, as well as the left-wing New
People’s Army and Revolutionary
People’s Army. In these circumstances,
an accord between the government
and any single rebel group, however
significant, was exclusionary by defini-
tion, and thus risked falling short of 
the disparate aspirations of both other
armed Moro groups and unrepresented
civil society organizations.
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) has a population of about 2 million 
people. As of May 2000, 413,171 individuals from 
60 towns and cities have been displaced. Its
four component provinces are among the most
depressed in the Philippines, with a 51% to 54%
poverty incidence, according to 1991 data from 
the National Economic Development Authority.
About 44% of the population is in the 1-14 years
age bracket, and 56% of the population is in the
15-64 years age bracket. The average income 
of the region is approximately 60% of the national
average. Only 6 out of ten ARMM residents aged
10 to 64 years enjoy functional literacy, compared
to nine out of ten in the national capital region.
The ARMM has the lowest life expectancy, per-
centage of high school graduates, primary and
secondary enrolment rates, level of functional 
literacy, and proportion of population without
improved access to water sources. 
2. Local Governance Context
As of 2002, the Philippines is divided into approxi-
mately 79 provinces, 112 cities, 1496 municipalities
and 41,944 baranguays. These provinces, cities
and municipalities constitute the country’s Local
Government Units (LGUs). 
LGUs were established as a result of the 1991
Local Government Code, which was intended to
radically transform the county’s highly centralized
administrative and political systems. The Code
transferred the delivery of a wide range of basic
services to LGUs, affecting the health, social 
services, environment, agriculture, public works,
education, tourism, telecommunications, and
housing sectors. In addition to the increased 
delivery of services, LGUs were equipped with
regulatory powers necessary to enforce legal 
provisions related to areas as diverse as environ-
mental laws, food inspection, reclassification of
agricultural lands, enforcement of national build-
ing codes, and land use & development control.
Another dimension of institutional reform was the
inclusion of civil society in the decision making
process. The Code provided for NGOs and people’s
organizations (POs) to be represented on local
development councils, local health boards and
local school boards. 
LGUs were also equipped with increased financial
stability and autonomy and far greater administrative
flexibility in addressing local challenges. Specifically,
LGUs were provided powers of taxation, a higher
proportion of national budgets and the ability to
access commercial sources of financing and enter
into partnerships with private sector interests.
Despite the wide-ranging nature of the reforms,
local governance in the Philippines is faced with
several challenges and limitations:
• Continued lack of financial resources at the
local level, and continued dominance of central
government in controlling resource allocation.
• Citizen participation has become a more regular
feature of local governance, though the extent
to which LGUs have developed partnerships
with civil society organizations is still limited.
• There continue to be regular instances of 
corruption and graft at the local level, 
associated with inadequate systems 
of local accountability.
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The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, 
better known as the ARMM, is a region located in
the southern portion of Mindanao and includes the
mainland provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao
and the traditional island centers of Muslim econo-
mic, political and cultural activities: Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu archipelago. Considered 
the 15th region of the Philippines, the Autonomous
Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created
on November 6, 1990 by Republic Act 6734, which
was later amended by RA 9054.
ARMM covers 94 municipalities, one city (Marawi)
and five provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao Sur,
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi). It is administered by the
Regional Autonomous Government. The national
and local governments provide social and health
services support in the region. 
Civil society in Mindanao, like that in other
regions, is a complicated terrain of networks,
coalitions and political alignments. Varying orien-
tations and interests compete for popular atten-
tion, loyalty and sources of funding. The inherent
tensions among some of these groups are rooted
in their divergent political orientations. At times
they explode in what the non-governmental organ-
isation (NGO) community refers to as ‘turfing’, or
the concern of one network to protect its line of
work or ‘turf’.
3. Project Description
The Zones of Peace project has two main 
components: (1) a six-month
project to strengthen the ties
between local government
workers and the civil society
so they can work together 
to sustain peace; and (2) 
support for local teams to
develop a formal proposal 
to launch their own Zones 
of Peace. The principal
organizations involved in 
this initiative were the CIDA
funded Philippines-Canada
Local Government Support
Program (LGSP) and CO
Multiversity sa Mindanaw.36
What is a Zone of Peace? 
A Zone of Peace is loosely understood in this project to describe many kinds of endeavors, some partly
community-initiated, arising from the concept of establishing a territory where everyone (refugees, 
former rebels and soldiers) can rebuild their lives in solidarity and relative peace.
Zones of Peace are geographical areas, ranging in size from the area covered by a neighborhood to 
that of a province, which community residents themselves declare off-limits to armed conflict. They are
not, however, simply gun-free zones. Zones of Peace are actual and operational community-managed
entities that are gaining ground all over the country. Based on terms and conditions set by the people
themselves, they are maintained and reinforced by the community’s sustained, creative expressions of
commitment to peace-building which are expressed and managed through community-based imple-
menting structures. 
Peace Zones constitute a people-initiated, community-based response to the situation of raging armed
conflict in the country. Zones of Peace contribute to build a constituency for peace at the grassroots
level, and work to immediately relieve local communities, especially the civilian population, of the burden of
war. Through Zones of Peace action, communities seek to create a social space in which to address and
resolve community issues as well as to explore alternative modes of conflict resolution, in accordance
with their local culture and traditions. The term Zone of Peace has also been used to describe UNDP
supported resettlement sites for families of former rebels belonging to the MNLF. In this case, Peace Zones
have been accorded the status of ‘special development areas’, and as such, communities are treated as
sites where roots of non-peace may be addressed through the implementation of development projects. 
Despite the variation in understanding and use of the term Zones of Peace, there are basic parameters
within which the concept should be located. Zones of Peace are:
• people initiated responses to armed conflict
• locally-based and locally-focused 
• a means of addressing immediate issues of militarized violence
• a foundation for pluralism and dialogue
• implemented by community-based structures
• empowering, giving communities the opportunity to make decisions that affecting the community.
In the Philippines, there is both an awareness of and a place for, Zones of Peace within national and
local political cultures14. 
14 To the point of having one of the best explanations of ZOPS articulated in national legislation:  Explanatory Note to the Peace Zones Policy Act of 2000 
by Rep. Jaime D. Jacob in the Eleventh Congress of the Republic of the Philippines (ENPZPA) http://justpeace.net.ph/process/legal/le2000_1013_01.htm
The objective of the Zones of Peace project is to
strengthen LGU and civil society capacities for the
promotion of peace and unity. Community organiz-
ing is an integral approach in the overall project
strategy, as is the integration of gender equality.
The project proposal outlines four main stages 
for the project:
1) Community profiling of the Zones of Peace
using Participatory Resource Appraisal
2) Zone of Peace development planning based 
on results of a profiling activity
3) Issue-based mobilization and implementation
based on Zone of Peace development plans,
including the implementation of pilot projects
for peace and development 
4) Monitoring and evaluation of the pilot projects
and consolidation of peace and development
initiatives
The primary activities used include: 
• Capacity Building Workshops – On-site work-
shops on Community Profiling, Participatory
Resource Appraisal, Peace Zone/Barangay
Development Planning and Project Development
and Management to be participated in by CSOs
(NGO/PO leaders, COs). As its counterpart con-
tribution to the project, CO Multiversity will field
two trained Community Organizers who will
train local volunteers from the CSOs in each
peace zone. The proponent shall ensure that
there is gender balance in the selection of the
participants for the workshops.
• Mentoring/ Coaching – On-site individual
and/or small group mentoring/coaching of each
LGU on (1) the formulation and advocacy of local
policies identified in the barangay development
plans of the peace zones (ordinances and
implementing guidelines); and, (2) monitoring
and evaluation of projects/ action areas identi-
fied for initial implementation
The first project component involves a series 
of pilot workshops in four of the nine towns in 
the ARMM affected by the war. The goal of the
workshops was to establish and nurture long-
term peacebuilding among local individuals and 
institutions, and to relocate peace as a significant
cultural value in the people’s sense of history and
consciousness.
The second component of the project flows directly
from the first: establishing Zones of Peace in six
LGUs in which capability-building workshops had
been held. LGUs will be mentored in peace nego-
tiations, facilitation and dialogue skills, to enable
them to develop and strengthen Peace and Order
Councils in their locality. 
Project Location: Balabagan, Kapatagan,
Matanog, Datu Odin Sinsuat
The specific project sites for launching Zones of
Peace were four towns in the ARMM affected 
by the war: Balabagan, Kapatagan, Matanog and
Datu Odin Sinsuat. Three of the four towns are
contiguous and adjacent areas along the coast of
Illana Bay. The Narciso Ramos Highway, scenes 
of several bloody and fierce battles during the
“All-Out War” against the MILF in 2000, has been
built through the towns as a main passageway.
The economy in the area is largely agricultural, 
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through small trading and fishing businesses aug-
menting incomes. A handful of professionals and
educated townspeople make up the leadership
and local government workers. 
Waves of migration have made these places politi-
cally fragile: people of different religions, histories
and cultures have interacted for at least three
generations now. The populations in the project
sites include a majority of native Islamic tribes
(Maranaos, Maguindanaos and Iranuns), as well
as 10-40 percent migrants. 
One of the sites, Matanog, is the heartland of the
MILF struggle for self-rule. The rebels continue to
have control over the biggest MILF stronghold. It 
is also the seat of highly religious ulama or Islamic
spiritual leaders who believe in the potential of
Islam as a force for change and peace. 
Balabagan keeps a fragile harmony 
between its majority
Muslim inhabitants and
its Christian-Visayan
migrants in balance, 
in large part because of
the familial history of the
town mayor. A blend of
cultures makes the town
progressive, though at the same time volatile.
Most residents are supportive of the government,
military peacekeeping forces and the political status
quo rather than the MNLF or MILF. Balabagan has
therefore been the target of rebel attacks and
clashes since the 1960s.
Kapatagan is a classic disaster area: it suffered
the most during the war as its predominantly
Muslim population is perceived to be rebel 
supporters. It is also conflict-ridden by various
unresolved ridos (blood feuds). Its mayor has 
kept a cautious stance vis-à-vis her defeated 
political opponent: the elections which brought
her to office have been contested and her oppo-
nent, who owns the land on which the town hall 
is built, refuses to allow her to hold office there. 
The experience of conflict in Datu Odin Sinsuat
is quite unique: it was considered an oasis during
the 2000 MILF – military war. Spillover effects from
nearby clashes, including the stream of refugees and
fugitive rebels as well as the soldiers’ encampments,
have been a burden for the town. Its inclusion along
with disaster towns in the project could provide
lessons for towns that have served as a sort of
caregiver during and after violent conflict. 
The Role of Local Government in the Project
The objectives of the Zones of Peace project are
focused on strengthening the capacity of LGUs
and civil society organizations in order to promote
peace and unity. The project will do this by:
• enhancing the awareness and commitment 
of LGUs and CSOs to address peace and unity
issues identified by residents of peace zones;
• mobilizing formal and non-formal structures
and mechanisms within LGUs for addressing
issues and coordinating policy support in
declared peace zones; and
• consolidating LGU and CSO initiatives on 
peace and unity in declared peace zones in
to sustainable and replicable programs.
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The mayor of Balabagan’s
mother, a Christian with
Cebuano roots, converted to
Islam when she married the
sultan’s first-born son. Her 
marriage to a mixed-blooded
Muslim sealed a reconciliation
between two feuding clans,
and therein, a fragile peace 
in Balabagan. 
4. Good Practice in Local Governance 
& Peacebuilding
Good practices suggested below apply to project
design rather than implementation. 
Peacebuilding projects are people projects.
Peacebuilding is not a mechanistic, linear, exercise;
it is organic, responsive and fundamentally creative.
Thus, project proposals, which must frame their
work in the language of the donor, often sit uneasily
with the fluidity and unpredictability of peace work
in conflict-prone areas. At best, proposal writing
serves as an interesting and thought-provoking
exercise that helps to map out a tiny portion of 
the project terrain. A critical assessment of the
project proposal should spend less time guessing
about objectives and outputs and more time on the
quality and character of the individuals involved,
i.e., What is their track record, demonstrated levels
of commitment to peace, integrity and level 
of connectedness to the issues and 
communities?
Respond to and harness aspirations for
peace. The planned capability building workshops
may constitute a good practice in so far as they
create the space within which communities can (1)
define for themselves both the obstacles and the
opportunities for peace in their community; (2) decide
whether and how to move forward collectively;
and (3) acquire useful and culturally appropriate
skills that may be applied to the first two.
Understanding people and context is essential
to project success. While we need monitoring
tools, we also need an understanding of what has
happened and why it has happened; we need
reflection and learning. How can an individual
maintain his or her commitment in the face of
assassination threats, attempts and other such
daunting challenges and obstacles? The answers
to these types of questions will tell us more about
the potential success or failure of a project than
the most sophisticated monitoring methodologies.
This is essential for sound project management 
as well as project transferability. 
Prioritize the development of relationships
which will sustain peace. The Zones of Peace
is designed to allow time to develop relationships
between the project team and partner communities
– relationships that can be consolidated in the six-
month capability building exercises. Peacebuilding
requires relationship building, and cannot be
successful without it. 
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Support champions at the local level.
A champion is someone who, through moral 
influence, quiet diplomacy, public presence, or
skillful negotiation and maneuvering, is able to
positively affect the thinking and behaviour of
groups and individuals. By changing individuals
and groups, champions induce structural changes
in economic, political, and social systems. A
champion is usually someone who already has 
a positive profile in the community, who knows 
the rules of the game and wants change that 
contributes to peace and unity. Champions are
particularly important in environments character-
ized by distrust, such as post-conflict settings. 
In most of the project sites in the Zones of 
Peace project, there is at least one individual 
who appears to be an essential champion for 
the project.
Mentor for Peace. Mentoring requires trust.
Trust requires honesty. Honesty requires empathy.
Empathy requires communication. Communication
requires presence. These four characteristics serve
as the four pillars of mentoring. Their presence
does not guarantee success, but their absence
does guarantee failure of a mentoring project.
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Case Study 4
ABSTRACT
The aim of the Gender, Peace and Development (GENPEACE)
project is to facilitate the journey from conflict to peace in
conflict affected communities in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, the Philippines. Through peace literacy
education and the establishment of community radio stations,
the project has successfully built local capacity for and 
commitment to building structures of peace. As a result of the
project, levels of community knowledge and participation in
municipal affairs have increased notably. The GENPEACE
project is an example of how to support and work with 
communities so that they come to own their own peace.
Note: Sections 1 and 2 present the same contextual information 
provided in Case Study 3: Zones of Peace Project. If you have read
the Peacebuilding & Unity Context and Local Government Context in
Case Study 3 closely, you may want to move ahead to Section 3:
Project Description.
1. Peacebuilding & Unity Context16
The socio-political context of the proposed sites
for the Zones of Peace (ZOP) project reflects the
complexity of the Philippine geography – an archi-
pelago with differing concentrations of conflict
and social organization, where even the history 
of peace negotiations is disjointed and diverse.
Mindanao’s Muslim (or Moro) and indigenous
Lumad peoples, now outnumbered by majority
Filipinos – the largely Christian descendants of
20th century settlers from the northern and central
Philippines – are asserting rights to their tradition-
al lands and to self-determination. 
15 This section was written by Kenneth Bush, with input from Myn Garcia.
16  This section draws directly from the comprehensive report prepared by Conciliation Resources (1999). 
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) resorted
to a war for independence in the 1970s, after
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law. Meanwhile, a communist-led rebellion
spread from the northern Philippines to Mindanao,
drawing in many
majority Filipinos,
particularly
among the rural
poor, and some
Lumads into the
New People’s
Army (NPA).
Moro rebellion
has been
explained as a
response to the
forcible annexation and consequent historical
injustice by Islamicized ethno-linguistic groups 
in Mindanao.
September 1996 is a critical date on the 
path towards lasting peace in the Philippines
because that was when the Mindanao 
Peace Agreement was signed between 
former President Ramos
and the Governor of the
Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao. All
previous attempts to
negotiate an end to the
24 years of civil war – 
in which over 120,000
people died – had failed to define a sustainable
settlement. After the Agreement, both the
Government and local leaders seemed genuinely
committed to post-conflict reconstruction for
peace and development in Mindanao, especially 
in the Special Zone of Peace and Development
(SZOPAD). 
In mid-2000, full scale war began again in
Mindanao, fully destroying the ceasefires with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and MNLF.
Militarized 
violence devas-
tated already
weakened levels
of agricultural
production, 
infrastructure,
and economic
development.
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Many scholars argue that the
Mindanao conflicts are not fueled 
by religious differences, though the 
Muslim and Christian vigilante groups
appeared and attacked the other com-
munities and places of worship. The
economic and political deprivations of
minorization (relative deprivations, loss
of ancestral domains, militarization 
and Rights violations) are more often
identified as underlying causes of the
conflict. More recently, emphasis has
been placed on the cultural dimension:
competing world views, ways of life
and values related to land ownership,
governance and justice.
Like all peace processes, the government-MNLF process was distinctively creative in its design and implemen-
tation. The strategies the parties pursued in the four years of negotiations show a commendable approach to
peacemaking — in their commitment to maintaining multiple channels of dialogue and communication, in their
approach to institutionalising communication and negotiations and through the use of informal networks. The
Ramos government’s approach to negotiations (defined as the ‘Six Paths to Peace’) is an example of enormous
international value in rhetorical intent and practice. Yet despite a negotiating process exemplary in so many
ways, the resulting settlement has appeared vulnerable from the start. The much vaunted ‘consensus and 
consultations’ were largely limited to the negotiating parties, except for a few token efforts to communicate 
with civil society organizations. Thus both parties found it difficult to persuade a wider public of the wisdom 
of the deal when its terms were finally announced.
The 1996 Peace Agreement should not
have been expected to end violence in
Mindanao. The MNLF was only one of
several groups that had taken up arms
against the Philippine government. 
The others included the MILF, the much
smaller Abu Sayyaf and Islamic Command
Council, as well as the left-wing New
People’s Army and Revolutionary
People’s Army. In these circumstances,
an accord between the government
and any single rebel group, however
significant, was exclusionary by defini-
tion, and thus risked falling short of 
the disparate aspirations of both other
armed Moro groups and unrepresented
civil society organizations.
The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) has a population of about 2 million 
people. As of May 2000, 413,171 individuals from 
60 towns and cities have been displaced. Its
four component provinces are among the most
depressed in the Philippines, with a 51% to 54%
poverty incidence, according to 1991 data from 
the National Economic Development Authority.
About 44% of the population is in the 1-14 years
age bracket, and 56% of the population is in the
15-64 years age bracket. The average income 
of the region is approximately 60% of the national
average. Only 6 out of ten ARMM residents aged
10 to 64 years enjoy functional literacy, compared
to nine out of ten in the national capital region.
The ARMM has the lowest life expectancy, per-
centage of high school graduates, primary and
secondary enrolment rates, level of functional 
literacy, and proportion of population without
improved access to water sources. 
2. Local Governance Context
As of 2002, the Philippines is divided into approxi-
mately 79 provinces, 112 cities, 1496 municipalities
and 41,944 baranguays. These provinces, cities
and municipalities constitute the country’s Local
Government Units (LGUs). 
LGUs were established as a result of the 1991
Local Government Code, which was intended to
radically transform the county’s highly centralized
administrative and political systems. The Code
transferred the delivery of a wide range of basic
services to LGUs, affecting the health, social 
services, environment, agriculture, public works,
education, tourism, telecommunications, and
housing sectors. In addition to the increased 
delivery of services, LGUs were equipped with
regulatory powers necessary to enforce legal 
provisions related to areas as diverse as environ-
mental laws, food inspection, reclassification of
agricultural lands, enforcement of national build-
ing codes, and land use & development control.
Another dimension of institutional reform was the
inclusion of civil society in the decision making
process. The Code provided for NGOs and people’s
organizations (POs) to be represented on local
development councils, local health boards and
local school boards. 
LGUs were also equipped with increased financial
stability and autonomy and far greater administrative
flexibility in addressing local challenges. Specifically,
LGUs were provided powers of taxation, a higher
proportion of national budgets and the ability to
access commercial sources of financing and enter
into partnerships with private sector interests.
Despite the wide-ranging nature of the reforms,
local governance in the Philippines is faced with
several challenges and limitations:
• Continued lack of financial resources at the
local level, and continued dominance of central
government in controlling resource allocation.
• Citizen participation has become a more regular
feature of local governance, though the extent
to which LGUs have developed partnerships
with civil society organizations is still limited.
• There continue to be regular instances of 
corruption and graft at the local level, 
associated with inadequate systems 
of local accountability.
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The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, 
better known as the ARMM, is a region located in
the southern portion of Mindanao and includes the
mainland provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao
and the traditional island centers of Muslim econo-
mic, political and cultural activities: Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu archipelago. Considered 
the 15th region of the Philippines, the Autonomous
Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created
on November 6, 1990 by Republic Act 6734, which
was later amended by RA 9054.
ARMM covers 94 municipalities, one city (Marawi)
and five provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao Sur,
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi). It is administered by the
Regional Autonomous Government. The national
and local governments provide social and health
services support in the region. 
Civil society in Mindanao, like that in other
regions, is a complicated terrain of networks,
coalitions and political alignments. Varying orien-
tations and interests compete for popular atten-
tion, loyalty and sources of funding. The inherent
tensions among some of these groups are rooted
in their divergent political orientations. At times
they explode in what the non-governmental organ-
isation (NGO) community refers to as ‘turfing’, or
the concern of one network to protect its line of
work or ‘turf’.
3. Project Description
The Gender, Peace and Development Project
(GENPEACE) is aimed at promoting a culture 
of peace and gender development among the 
Tri-people (Christians, Muslims and indigenous
Lumads) in areas affected by the Mindanao con-
flict. This is being achieved through peace literacy
education and a joint education and communica-
tion initiative to install community radio stations.
The project integrates gender in all of its activities,
and is building the capacity of women leaders 
and peace promoters to integrate gender equality
in their work. 
Since May 1999, the GENPEACE project has 
been implemented by the Notre Dame Foundation
for Charitable Activities-Women in Enterprise
Development (NDFCAI-WED) and its partners
Neighbours Population and Development Services,
Inc. (NPDSI) and Sarang Bangun Foundation, Inc.
(SBFI). The project is also being replicated in part-
nership with selected Peace and Development
Councils (PDCs), in order to enhance its develop-
ment impact throughout the southern Philippines. 
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The objectives of the 
GENPEACE project 
are to:
• promote gender 
sensitive community-
based peace education
in conflict affected areas
in Mindanao and build
capacities of commu-
nities in developing 
and managing peace
activities in their areas;
• mainstream non-formal education programs 
of functional literacy and continuing education
into community-based actions plans through
partnership and improved governance; and
• promote the use of community radio as tool for
enhancing community mobilization, collabora-
tive actions, develop effective communications
among the people, for peace promotion and
community development.
The GENPEACE project has two main project 
components: 
• Literacy and Peace Education. Non-formal edu-
cation classes are organized in communities,
based on the needs of each community. The
choice of the nature and kind of intervention 
is demand driven: the community of learners
identifies the type of classes to be organized.
The classes may be functional literacy for level
0 to 3 learners and/ or continuing education 
for functionally literate out-of-school youth 
and adults. These classes are designed to
raise critical awareness and consciousness 
for peacebuilding activities that are culture 
sensitive and relevant.
• Installation of Community Radio. 
Community radio stations are installed 
in identified project
sites. LGU’s act as a
monetary counterpart
for the purchase of
the radio transmitter
while the project 
provides other radio
equipment and capa-
bility building train-
ing workshops. A
Community Media
Council of multi-
sector membership is organized to manage,
supervise and control the radio station. The
station is designed to provide vital community
news and information to the residents of the
municipality. It also is used for regular report of
education, literacy and training. Peace promo-
tion and confidence building is regularly aired.
In addition to these two components, the promo-
tion of gender-sensitive peace education has been
an integral part of project activities. The project has
played a vital role in promoting gender-sensitive
peace education in the identified project sites.
This is being done by providing both women and
men equal access to community-based education
and other capability-building activities. Social
Mobilization activities were conducted at the very
beginning of the project, to gain community support
for the project, gain their input on focus and activities
and explain why women are prime targets of the
project. In Muslim communities, religious leaders
are involved in areas where gender issues are
considered sensitive. 
45
Developing an understand-
ing of “owning conflict” is 
as important as developing
the capacity of communities
to “own peace”. Peacebuilding
entails both the construction
of the structures of peace
and the deconstruction of
the structures of violence.
Thus, developing an under-
standing of how communi-
ties and governments own
conflict, i.e., sustain conflict
through attitudes, actions,
non-actions etc., is an
essential ingredient to
peace and unity.
One thing that has been
noticed about the GENPEACE
project is the underdeveloped
link or connection between the
peace literacy classes and the
community radio in the imple-
mentation of the project. For
example, it is unclear how 
the radio project was used to
launch distance learning pro-
grams, which may address 
the geographical challenge of
reaching far-flung villages and
encouraging communities to
make more constructive use 
of radio.
Project Location: Six municipalities in Mindanao
The GENPEACE project is located in a number of
different sites across the
southern Philippines:
Sultan sa Barongis, Ipil,
Busbus, Siocon, Malita
and Lake Sebu. These
sites were selected
based on the following
criteria:
• Established Peace and Literacy Councils
• High rates of illiteracy
• High need/ demand for the project
• Community readiness to take part in the 
project as full stakeholders
• Strategic geographic location
• LGU ability to provide financial counterpart
funds
Though each of the project sites is unique, they
share these characteristics, and others such as:
previous history of conflict; high incidence of
poverty; inadequate basic services and livelihood
support mechanism such as water supply and
electrification; low levels of participation in the
development process by poor and marginalized
sectors; patriarchal and warring leadership; and
limited communication between local government
units and the displaced populace on issues of 
governance. In most communities, unclear and
fragmented LGU programs and services have led
to deteriorating relationships leading to distrust
and suspicion of government motives. Presence of
military troops in the area caused apprehension
and animosity among the civilian population. In
some areas, isolation and discrimination of various
tribes have caused great disparity.
Sultan sa Barongis is one of the areas in Central
Mindanao that was affected by the armed conflict.
It is characterized by a high incidence of poverty,
illiteracy, inadequate delivery of basic services
and limited participation of the poor in community
affairs. The area is part of the Special Zone of
Peace and Development (SZOPAD), and has been
a center of contention between government and
rebel forces. Inadequate delivery of basic services
by government is a major factor contributing to
under-developed schools, roads and bridges, health
clinics, electric power and telecommunication.
The situation is aggravated by rampant corruption,
drug pushing, warring clans and family feuds. 
The municipality of Ipil includes four barangays
(Tinan, Bacalan, Logan and Dumandan), which 
are referred to as TIBALOD. These communities
were chosen as a pilot area of the GENPEACE
Project because of the Lumad population, however,
because of the presence of Muslims and Christian
migrants, TIBALOD are also tri-people. 
Busbus is a community of mainly Tausug population,
mixed with the Sama, Visayans and Bajau. The
area is home to many MNLF and MILF combatants
and some splinter groups. The years of armed
conflict 16 and the continuing unstable peace con-
ditions have left it impoverished, underdeveloped 
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17 According to Amnesty International, military operations against Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim separatist armed group involved primarily in kidnapping for ransom, continued
throughout the year mainly on Jolo and Basilan islands. In May 2001, group members kidnapped 17 Filipinos and three US citizens from a tourist resort in Palawan
and transported them to Basilan. Amid further kidnappings, ransom payments and periodic releases, at least 15 hostages were reported murdered. By the end 
of 2001, two US citizens and a Filipina remained captive. There were reports of arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions and torture, by military and paramilitary 
personnel, of civilians suspected of being Abu Sayyaf members or sympathizers. This begs the question: What is/ will be  the impact of this situation on the project
and vice versa?
An effective element in 
GENPEACE is the presence of
effective community organizing
from the onset. This makes a
big difference in mobilizing the
community and stimulating the
interest of the different stake-
holders to recognize the need
to reflect on their prevailing 
situation and consequently 
not just own peace but own
conflict as well.
and alienated. Ongoing fighting between these
groups and the government has forced families to
flock to different evacuation centers. Widespread
abject poverty is a major factor in the increased
recruitment of civilians into the military component
of the dissident groups, as government is corrupt
and has failed to deliver basic services. Project
implementation in Busbus has been a major problem
because of the conflict between the Sarang Bangun
Foundation and its community-based implementers.
The municipalities of Siocon (known by local 
residents as “Paraiso”),
Malita and Lake Sebu
are all isolated commu-
nities that remain 
under-developed. 
Role of Local Government in the Project
While the project was not focused primarily on 
the role of local government, LGUs played a wide
range of roles in project implementation. Most 
significant was the strong leadership provided by
LGU Mayor and senior elected officials in ensuring
local acceptance by championing the project.
Moreover, champions within the LGU, i.e. Mayor,
Vice Mayor, Budget Officer, enabled the Council 
to support the project and allocate the required
budget to take it off the ground. LGUs were also
instrumental in building strategic partnerships with
community organizations. Follow-up institutional
support was evident in facilitating the establish-
ment of multi-stakeholder committees used to
oversee Community Radio Stations and to launch
local literacy classes. LGUs also provided direct
monetary support for the purchase of the radio
equipment as well as staff support to assist in
project delivery. 
4. Good Practice in Local Governance 
& Peacebuilding
Support of local leaders as champions. A
champion is someone who, through moral influ-
ence, quiet diplomacy, public presence, or skillful
negotiation and maneuvering, is able to positively
affect the thinking and behaviour of groups and
individuals. By changing individuals and groups,
champions induce structural changes in econo-
mic, political, and social systems. A champion is
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Sensitivities of Language
By calling the town “Siocon”
instead of “Paraiso,” is the 
project aggravating local 
sensitivities?  In politically
charged geographies, 
language and place names
become part of the conflict.
Consciousness about language
and pronunciation is essential
if trust is to be earned from
communities.
usually someone who already has a positive pro-
file in the community, who knows the rules of the
game and wants change that contributes to peace
and unity. Champions are particularly important in
environments characterized by distrust, such as
post-conflict settings.
In most of the GENPEACE sites there was reference
to an individual who appeared to be essential for
catalyzing the project, e.g., Mayor and/or Vice Mayor.
This was particularly demonstrated in Sultan sa
Barongis, Siocon, Malita and Lake Sebu. The LGU
of Sultan sa Barongis, led by a committed Mayor,
also gave its full support to the GENPEACE Project.
The Mayor of Siocon enthusiastically welcomed
the project in his municipality, and appointed 
a local contact person to work in support of it. 
In Malita and Lake Sebu, Vice Mayors exerted 
a strong and positive influence in the LGU, con-
vincing the Mayors and council members to 
take on the community radio project. 
Focus on change at the municipal level.
The GENPEACE Project is delivered at the scale 
of municipalities, as they present a suitable size
and relative level of cohesion in which to achieve
project results.
Generating active community participation
helps sustain results. Measurable change has
been noted in the levels of active participation and
involvement in community assemblies gatherings
by community members in all project sites. During
recent village elections, there was also a drastic
increase on the number of voters in the different
project sites, as well as independent voting by
peace literacy learners who used to be assisted
by other persons in the polling precinct. Engaging
peace literacy learners as broadcasters is a 
distinct feature of the radio station in Sultan sa
Barongis, and another means of generating active
community involvement in its own development. 
One of most positive results of the project has
been the emergence of People’s Organizations 
in three project sites. These organizations are
largely a product of capacity building and resource
development activities designed to develop and
strengthen the institutional and staff capabilities 
of community-based organizations to design, 
manage, implement, monitor and evaluate projects.
POs are now active partners of the LGUs that are
able to source funds from funding agencies and
implement community-based projects. Even once
the GENPEACE project comes to an end, these
POs will be able to lead and sustain community
participation in municipal affairs. 
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Build multi-stakeholder partnerships.
A multi-stakeholder approach, engaging government,
donors/NGOs, civil society organizations and the
local community, is a necessary ingredient for
positive peace and unity. The resulting partner-
ships between these stakeholders, e.g. commu-
nities and their elected leaders, strengthens and
empowers all parties involved. Of special note 
are the Community Media Councils, which have a
multi-stakeholder membership, that play a crucial
role in ensuring the sustainability of the commu-
nity radio project beyond donor inputs. Also, 
the support of strong and active Peace and 
Order Councils, a local government body like 
the Municipal Peace and Development Task 
Force, increases legitimacy and sustainability. 
Facilitate local ownership through community-
based initiatives. Community participation 
and ownership are crucial aspects of long-term
sustainability of both development impact and
peace and unity impact. Social cohesion is strongest
when majority of members consider themselves to
be stakeholders in a particular activity and concern.
Conversely, it is weakest when majority are alien-
ated or ‘stakeless’. The GENPEACE project empha-
sizes community demand-driven development needs.
Communities are encouraged to identify needs 
relevant to them, and through intensive consulta-
tions, interventions are identified and focused on.
There is an increasing realization among the tri-
people of Mindanao that development and progress
is synonymous to peace. This is increasingly evi-
dent in the active participation 
of community-based stakeholders in the project;
GENPEACE is a way to improve their communities
while building peace and unity. 
Institutionalizing a neutral space helps 
build peace and unity. The GENPEACE project
created fora within which different communities
and community stakeholders could meet each
other on issues of concern or interest. This neutral
inter-group space was immensely important for
building relationships between groups, and bringing
people from a place of self-interest to one where
joint interests were the primary topic.
Develop strategies to deconstruct structures
of violence and construct structures of 
peace. Building peace and unity demands that 
we de-segregate the minds of formerly segregated
peoples. Communities cannot desegregate until
the idea of de-segregation has taken root – not
necessarily in every member of a community, 
but in enough individuals to develop a sustainable
critical mass of interest in fundamental change.
The community radio element of the GENPEACE
project was an important means of educating
communities for de-segregation. As an exercise 
in non-formal education, community radio is flexible
enough to explore topics (e.g., biography, geogra-
phy) that have been divisive for communities. De-
segregating the mind through educational activities
has a positive impact on the dynamics of peace
and unity. Community radio has been a key strategy
for doing so in the GENPEACE project.
Include ex-combatants. The participation 
of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
ex-combatants in mainstream community develop-
ment affairs through the GENPEACE Project was
significant and important, in terms of both the
deconstruction of structures of violence and the
construction of structures of peace.
Develop an understanding of the need to
“own conflict” and “own peace”. Given that
peacebuilding entails both the construction of 
the structures of peace and the deconstruction 
of the structures of violence, it is essential to
develop an understanding of the capacity of 
communities to “own conflict” as well as “own
peace.” Understanding how communities and 
governments sustain conflict through attitudes,
actions, non-actions, and etc., how they “own
conflict”, is an essential ingredient to peace 
and unity.
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5. Lessons Learned
Weak LGU credibility is a key element of conflict
All project sites were characterized by a history 
of conflict, due in part to the limitations of local
government. Several factors limited local govern-
ment credibility:
• Inability to deliver basic services: Unclear and
fragmented LGU programs and service have
led to deteriorating relationships leading to 
distrust and suspicion of government motives.
• Exclusion of the population from governance:
Limited communication between local govern-
ment units and the displaced populace on
issues of governance denied community 
members the opportunity to be part of 
participatory planning. 
• Corruption: There are continued problems 
of corruption and lack of accountability at 
the local level.
The lack of credibility and the inability of local
government to play an effective leadership role
hinders progress towards peace and unity.
Media plays a vital role in building peace
Media plays a crucial role in the peace process,
particularly radio, which has the greatest influence
at the community level. Media sets the agenda for
public debate, though it may not participate directly
in negotiations. It plays an intermediary facilitator
role and acts as a vehicle for information. Media
practitioners’ relationships with civil society
(NGOs, people’s organizations and rebel groups)
affect coverage of the peace process. 
In the Philippines, they have tended to see civil
society groups as unimportant and hence not
newsworthy. Their perceptions of these groups
are shaped by their political conservatism, and
they rarely consult NGOs for news related to 
their social development work. Moreover, media
discussions on the peace process have virtually
omitted civil society efforts at peace advocacy.
The lack of media attention to the vital issues
encompassed by the peace process has also 
contributed to popular misconceptions about the
talks between the government and the MNLF, 
and a resurfacing of the age-old prejudices
between Christians and Muslims.
A new breed of journalists appears to be emerging
in the Philippines: men and women who advocate
community journalism. This is supported and illus-
trated by the recent creation of the Center for
Community Journalism and Development. This
Centre aims to build capacities of local media 
to enable them to make the transformation from
war correspondents to peace advocates, from
sensational news journalists to investigative,
development reporters and from adversaries 
of local government to critical partners for good 
governance. While such journalists are still 
challenged (and at times threatened) by the 
political powers within mainstream media,
progress is evident.
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Conclusion
5
The starting point for a local governance framework
for peacebuilding is the recognition that local 
government both affects, and is affected by, the
dynamics of peace and conflict.  However, while
focusing on the role of local government, it is 
necessary to consider the vital roles of national
and state/provincial governments, civil society 
and private sector organizations in building peace
and deconstructing conflict.   
The central objective of this document, and in 
particular the selected case studies, is to better
understand how municipal governments can play
a role in peacebuilding, and to learn how strength-
ening local government capacities in conflict-prone
settings can avoid violence while contributing to
peace and unity. The five areas of potential peace
or conflict impact – conflict management capacities;
militarized violence and human security; political
structures and processes; economic structures
and processes; and social empowerment – (see
Annex B) underscore the importance of building
effective governance at the local level. 
While this document is intended to demonstrate
the importance of strengthening municipal govern-
ment as an institutional mechanism to support
peacebuilding and conflict resolution, it is also
important to recognize that local government
capacity building and conflict resolution are not
synonymous. Local government capacity building
is necessarily a long-term process intended to
enable municipal governments to prevent or miti-
gate the likelihood of violent conflict. The process
of building local government capacity cannot
alone address the underlying structural causes 
of violent conflict. However, the long term effect 
of building strong local institutions is the capacity
for municipal governments to respond quickly, to
defuse potentially violent situations and to become
partners in mobilizing peace resources before,
during, and after violent conflict erupts.   
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Table 1 – Municipal Government Responsibilities
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Sector Sub-Sector  
Health Hospital capital  –  Public health   
Social Services Social assistance  –  Subsidized Day Care   
Housing Social housing assistance  –  Accommodation improvements  –  Regulations   
Local Democracy Public consultation and equity  –  Managing local elections   
Public Safety Police  –  Fire protection  –  Ambulance services  –  Emergency response   
Recreation & Culture Libraries/museums  –  Parks/playgrounds  –  Recreational activities  –  Arts programming  –
Community development  
Transportation Urban streets  –  Rural roads  –  Urban public transit  –  Road system lighting   –  
Airports  –  Harbors   
Environment Air quality  –  Drinking water quality standards  –  Water supplies  –  Sewers and 
storm drains  –   Wastewater treatment  –  Garbage removal and disposal   
Land Use Planning and Development Planning and zoning by-laws  –  Preservation of agricultural land  
Finances and Taxation Property assessment  –  Preparation, approval and auditing of budgets  –  Borrowing approval  
Local Economic Development Economic development  –  Community income generation  –  Poverty reduction programs
Annex B
Where to Look for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact?
AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT 
EXPLANATION
PEACE IMPACT CONFLICT IMPACT
Conflict Management
Capacities1 Capacity of state or civil society to (1) manage andresolve conflict without the use of violence, or without the use of authority structures that supportillegitimate violence; and (2) promote genuine and
sustainable peace.
Impact on capacity to identify and respond to 
peacebuilding opportunities and conflict – creating
challenges. This might include formal mechanisms
(dispute resolution boards; strengthening legal
mechanisms) or more informal mechanisms 
(low-key meetings, community leader interventions,
creating channels for local level dialogue).  
1) Initiatives in conflict prone areas that hire, 
train, and keep local personnel – especially in
administrative, technical, and management 
positions – strengthen governance capacities 
of state & societal institutions that deal with 
conflicts non-violently. Unfortunately, this is 
the technical and managerial capacity that 
flees when non-violent conflict turns or re-turns
violent.  
2)  Efforts by many organizations (international, 
governmental, and non-governmental) to include
conflict resolution and peacebuilding workshops
(and increasingly, PCIA) into their daily work is a
substantive contribution to the development of
capacities for peace.
3) Initiatives that maintain effective outreach, public
dialogue, or participatory activities help to keep
stakeholders involved and build inter-group trust
and understanding.
One of Kosovo’s most experienced human rights
activists who had been trained in Norway and
Geneva had helped to establish a women’s legal
aid center in the 1990s. During the UN-driven
reconstruction exercise she was reduced to a local
employee of the OSCE to translate for international
staff with a fraction of her experience. Officially, 
she was unable even to take testimony from victims.
This reservoir of local talent should have been 
the centerpiece of the UN reconstruction strategy.
However, the overall impact was a contribution to
the incapacity rather than capacity of civil society
to rebuild itself upon a foundation of tolerance 
and respect. (Guest 2000)
• Number of conflicts in which governmental/ 
non-governmental bodies are involved as 
mediators, facilitators, negotiators, etc.
• Perception of local mediators and aggrieved
parties that conflict can be resolved without
use of violence
• Number conflict resolution workshops – and
follow-up
• Respect for process and outcomes of dispute
settlement through public institutions 
• Belief in possibility of receiving fair treatment/
outcomes through public institutions
• Perception that violence is not a legitimate 
or effective means of resolving conflict
• Degree to which peace and conflict issues
are considered in the formulation and 
operation of initiatives (’Do No Harm‘, PCIA,
Conflict-Sensitive Programing, etc)
EXAMPLES
SAMPLE INDICATORS*
* (These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities).
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Where to Look for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact?
AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT 
EXPLANATION
Militarized Violence 
and Human Security2 Direct and indirect impact on (1) patterns and levelsof violence by militarised forces; and (2) an individual'sand community's sense of security or insecurity,including physical and mental well-being and sense
of individual or group identity.
Patterns of violence: Different groups in society
experience different types and levels of violence 
and therefore have different levels of insecurity, 
e.g., women, children, minority groups, marginalized
groups, and returnees.
Militarized forces include rebels, paramilitaries, 
war lords, militias, bandits, organized crime rings,
vigilante groups – when they use military weapons
and structures.
Community includes both resident populations and
returning populations
1) The inclusion of ex-combatants in peace and
reconstruction work in Nicaragua and parts of
Mindanao were clear efforts to deconstruct 
the structures of militarized violence” and to
”construct the structures of peace.
2) In many cases, the negotiations for humanitarian
ceasefires (e.g., National Immunization Days)
have opened up communication channels that
have later contributed directly to longer cease
fires and even peace talks, as in Sri Lanka. (Bush
2000).  In Somalia, the demand from the local
population that their children be immunized 
led local leaders to de-mine roads to permit
access for vaccination teams.  Orders were
issued to combatants that no weapons were to
be displayed on the days of the immunization
campaigns.  Such initiatives have dampened 
militarized violence and increased human 
security. 
Working with or through groups which use 
illegitimate violence and abuse human rights, 
e.g., protection of convoys, compounds and offices,
or as middlemen for the provision of goods and
services, is an obvious example of how an initiative
can strengthen rule by force and violence 
(threatened and actual).  
• Conflict-related deaths or injuries  
• Disappearances  
• Incidence of human rights abuses, including
rape, sexual torture and violations of children’s
rights and effectiveness of official responses to
reports of such violations
• Levels of domestic violence
• Number of riots or other uncontrolled 
expressions of dissent
• Demonstrations 
• Number of displaced people  
• Rate and patterns of repatriation/ displacement   
• Arrests or detention without probable cause 
or warrant  
• Incommunicado detention  
• Cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment  
in detention
• Inhumane conditions of detainment 
• Dependence on private security forces
• Perceptions of individual and 
collective security  
• Levels of criminality (effectiveness 
of state responses)   
• Number of small arms in circulation 
(e.g., black market price of an 
assault rifle)  
• Number of children, women and men
involved in military activities  
• Level of food security
EXAMPLES
SAMPLE INDICATORS*
* (These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities).
PEACE IMPACT CONFLICT IMPACT
Where to Look for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact?
AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT 
EXPLANATION
Political Structures 
and Processes3 Impact on formal and informal political structuresand processes. This could apply from the localmunicipal level through to the national level.  It alsorefers to strengthening the governance capacities 
of different levels of government, and the capacities
of civil society actors to actively and constructive
participate in the political process.
This might be evident in:  the strengthening of the
capacities of legitimate leaders (or reinforcing 
the rule of anti-democratic forces); increased 
(or decreased) transparency, accountability, and
participation in decisions affecting the public; the
strengthening or weakening of the rule of law and
representative government.
1) In the late 1990s, the Group for Environmental
Monitoring in South Africa undertook a 
far-reaching participatory, applied research 
project on the linkages between militarization
and ecology.  The positive peace impact was
clear in (1) the word-for-word inclusion of its
research and recommendations in government
defense policy; and (2) the mobilization of 
non-English speaking peasants for the project
enabled these groups to continue to express
their concerns long after the project was 
finished, and to contribute to on-going dialogue
with government on policies affecting their 
lives and livelihoods.
2)  Sustained efforts by local groups In the southern
Philippines to create Zones of Peace are inspira-
tional examples of how the mobilization of ideas
and people can begin to restructure the political
and military structures to create peace from 
the ground up – even in the midst of on-going
violence. 
The decision to accept the cheapest bid to 
rebuild a water tank in a rebel-controlled area 
of Country X in 2002 produced conflict-creating
impacts.  Because the project was undertaken by 
a rebel-controlled front company, workers were
forced to work for free, tractor owners were forced
to donate the use of their equipment. Funds that
should have gone to pay for labour, equipment 
and material, seem to have become a significant
financial contribution to the rebels. The project
reinforced the anti-democratic rule of the rebel
group, and had a further negative developmental
impact when the water tank was washed out 
during the rainy season.
The imposition of solutions by outside actors to 
the benefit of the imposing power, and the impover-
ishment of the recipient communities. For example:
the imposition of inappropriate reforms or solutions
by a central government in marginal or conflict-
affected areas; the bankrupting of a country by
conditions imposed by International Financial
Institutions in countries (e.g. Argentina); or 
invasions such as the war in Iraq.
• Freedom of speech/ media 
• Presence of multi-communal political 
parties/ business groups/ civil society orgs
• Free and fair elections (levels of 
participation in elections) 
• Levels of emergency rule in parts or all 
of the country  
• Freedom of movement 
• Public participation in, or influence on, 
the policy making process 
• Perceptions and evidence of corruption  
• Popular perceptions that the political, legal,
and security systems are fair, effective, and
responsive – or not 
EXAMPLES
SAMPLE INDICATORS*
* (These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities).
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Where to Look for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact?
AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT 
EXPLANATION
Economic Structures 
and Processes4 Impact on: • strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures and processes; • distortion/conversion of war economies; 
• economic infrastructure; 
• availability of scarce basic goods; 
• availability of investment capital to create 
economic and employment alternatives 
to war-fighting; 
• the stability of the banking system; 
• increasing or decreasing the economic 
dependence on military (or military-related)
employment; 
• productivity and the equitable distribution 
of non-war/ peace benefits; training; income
generation; 
• production of commercial products or services; 
• food insecurity; 
• exploitation, generation, or distribution 
of resources, esp. non-renewable resources
and the material basis of economic sustenance
or food security.
1) In Ethiopia, in the mid-1990s, water projects
improved access of displaced pastoralists to
water, and thus reduced a major source of 
conflict with local populations. 
2) In Somalia in the early 1990s, shopkeepers 
and merchants supported violence and looting
because their regular supplies of agricultural
goods for their markets had been destroyed by
the drought and clan conflict. In an attempt to
resolve this problem, a development worker
talked to a number of a number of development
agencies about implementing programmes 
which involved selling food aid to merchants 
on a regular basis, at stable prices, in order to
reduce their dependence on looted supplies. 
The projects encouraged merchants to apply
pressure on the militias to limit their disruption,
and to cut off a source of funding to the militias
who used the merchants' payments to purchase
more weapons. (Source: Natsios 1997)
Uneven distribution of public resources (jobs,
water, pensions, etc.); payment of taxes to warrior
organizations; discriminatory hiring practices;
weakening private market forces by working
through war economies.
In the mid-1990s, many international actors sought 
to strengthen the economic security of Russia as a
means of reducing instability in a country of war-prone
regions.  One particular area of activity was the 
re-writing of Russia's bankruptcy laws.  By forcing
companies that had been ignoring their creditors to
finally pay their debts, the new legislation led to big
increase in bankruptcies – which rose to 11,000 in
1999 from 4,300 in 1997.  With weak, money-losing
companies out of the market, analysts hoped that
the Russian economy would become more compet-
itive and robust. Instead, powerful politicians and
businessmen (some with murky links to organized
crime) often had their cronies named as court-
appointed managers of troubled companies, allow-
ing them to take over some of the firms and strip
them of any prize assets, thereby contributing to
economic insecurity, rather than security.
(Macleans, 20 May 2002, p. 65)
• Dependence on war economies (e.g., use of black
market; reliance on (para) military employment) 
• Number of jobs created in non-military 
related sectors
• Ratio of military expenditure to social 
expenditures by state
• Pre- versus post-conflict export and 
investment levels
• Level of economic control by local or national
actors for local or national interests
• National unemployment rate versus rate 
among vulnerable populations (ex-combatants,
returnee and displaced populations, war-disabled,
widows, youth, war-affected regions)
• Dependence on external assistance
• Availability of basic goods to all communities
• Personal savings rates
• Regional and national inflation rates
• Strength of foreign currency
• Number and size of new businesses
EXAMPLES
SAMPLE INDICATORS*
* (These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities).
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Where to Look for Potential Peace or Conflict Impact?
AREAS OF POTENTIAL 
PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT 
EXPLANATION
Social Empowerment5 Impact on creation of a culture of peace is characterized by constructive social communication,tolerance, inclusiveness, justice, participation, andrespect. Confidence and capacity of all members 
of society, from the weakest to the strongest, to
effectively overcome obstacles to a satisfying life.
A project in Haiti to reconstruct the police force
specifically recruited from communities which had
suffered rights abuses, because it was felt that they
were most sensitive to the need to protect and 
promote such rights.
Mentoring relationships between urban planning 
professional across inter-group boundaries in Bosnia
and Herzegovina supported the development of 
technical capacities as well as inter-group 
communication and understanding.
It is increasingly common to consult with commu-
nities before launching an initiative – sometimes 
this is the first and only time of contact. To the
extent that these meetings accept and work
through existing social power structures, they 
may reinforce social inequities and tensions.  
For example, authority structures which dis-
empower women, or certain social or 
economic groups.  
• Sense of local ownership over peace processes
• Levels of tolerance/ distrust  within cultural,
social, ethnic, political, religious organizations
• Level and type of social interactions between
groups
• Levels of inter-marriage
• Levels of bilingualism (where language is 
a political issue)
• Level of participation by marginalized or 
dis-empowered groups (i.e., women, the poor,
the disenfranchised) 
• Number of cross-cutting cultural or social 
organizations;
• Inclusive/exclusive schooling system
• Adult and children's perceptions of other
groups/levels of stereotyping; role of the 
media/levels of censorship
• Levels of trust between groups
• Rejection of a gun culture/militarized culture
(glorification military violence)
• Number of locally-initiated and run 
peacebuilding initiatives
• Level of dependence on outside support 
in conflict resolution and peacebuilding
• Number of families dislocated by conflict
• Number of families with at least one member
who is missing
• Levels of trauma within communities and
degree to which it interferes with normal
activities.  Effectiveness of responses to 
this trauma.
• Suicide rates (who? where? why?)
EXAMPLES
SAMPLE INDICATORS*
* (These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities).
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